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This thesis project examines the United States’ involvement during the second war in 
Iraq from 2003-2011.  The question that this thesis aims to study is why the Iraq War 
unfolded the way it did, and to disprove the notion that Iraq was never a winnable war.  
In reality, this thesis will prove that specific actions taken by the United States further 
exacerbated the relationship between the two main sectarian groups that resulted in 
years of revenge killing, which eventually evolved into a civil war.  These actions can 
be boiled down to poor management and staffing, incorrect policies in the early 
rebuilding stage, lacking a nationwide counterinsurgency plan, and finally failing to 
recognize the evolution of the conflict into a civil war.  Although the United States did 
experience some success in their postwar efforts in Iraq during the counterinsurgency 
phase dubbed “The Surge”, any efforts achieved during this time was reversed when the 
US withdrew in 2011, which allowed Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki to revert back to 
sectarian persecutions.  It is hoped that this research will allow the American public to 
understand why the conflict unfolded the way it did and show the consequences that 












In March 2003, the United States and coalition forces invaded Iraq with the goal 
to overthrow Saddam Hussein and establish a free and democratic Iraq.  The Iraq War 
(2003), since the beginning, has been controversial.  The war divided the United States 
politically and caused strained relations between the United States and their 
international allies.  Iraq and the region became destabilized, and the legacy of this 
conflict is still evident today in Iraq and across the Middle East.  
Over the years, a variety of opinions regarding the Iraq War have been 
expressed by many different authors attempting to understand what went wrong and 
why Iraq is still a primary focus of American foreign policy.  Two major theories have 
emerged regarding the American endeavor in Iraq.  Authors, like Andrew Bacevich, 
present the first theory
1
.  This theory proposed the idea that the conflict was a failed 
operation from the start and that regardless of the policy actions taken, the United States 
would have failed in their endeavor to free and stabilize Iraq.  This assertion is based on 
the internal political struggle between the different religious sects and ethnic identities 
and Iraqi society’s inability to rectify the divisions between these groups.   
The second theory has been put forward by those who served overseas and 
directly experienced Iraq firsthand (in a military or journalistic point of view), like 
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 Andrew Bacevich graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1969, and 
served in both Vietnam and the first Persian Gulf War in the 1990s.  Shortly, after the Persian Gulf War 
ended Bacevich retired at the rank of Colonel and went on to teach at West Point, Johns Hopkins, and 
now Boston University.  Andrew Bacevich’s son, 1
st
 LT. John Bacevich, was killed outside Samarra by 
an improvised explosive device in March 2007.  Some of Bacevich’s past work includes America’s War 
for the Greater Middle East: A Military History, The New American Militarism: How Americans are 






.  Her argument asserted that the operation in Iraq was not destined to 
fail, even with the political, religious, and ethnic tensions that arose during the conflict.  
Instead, this argument is based on the notion that, from the onset of the conflict, the 
United States took incomplete and wrongheaded policy actions towards Iraq, which 
resulted in the violence and the destabilization of the country. 
After an examination of the competing theories regarding the possible outcome 
in Iraq, the conclusion conveyed is that Iraq was a winnable conflict and was not 
destined to fail from the start based on predisposed ethnic and religious characteristics.  
Instead, a large degree of difficulty that the Americans faced was not because of 
sectarian and cultural differences within Iraq, as Bacevich suggested.  Instead, the larger 
problems that arose from the conflict came from policies that were self-inflicted on their 
mission, the establishment of a democratic and stable government in Iraq, which would 
become capable to control the security and safety within, while shaping a new identity 
for the future of Iraq.  Therefore, if the United States had instituted the correct policies 
from the start, the US would have successfully been able to cultivate a stronger 
relationship between the two primary sectarian divisions within Iraq from the start.  
Instead, their decisions divided the sects; and the violence that escalated into a sectarian 
civil war would have been dealt with much earlier and with more success.  
Consequently, policymakers failed to understand the conditions on the ground 
and the history and culture of Iraq, which put the Iraq project in a strenuous situation to 
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 Emma Sky, author of The Unraveling, is considered an expert regarding the Middle East.  She served 
overseas in the Middle East in several different capacities, including in Israel and the West Bank and 
several assignments in Iraq throughout the US Iraq conflict from 2003-2011.  Most notably, she served 
for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) from 2003-2004 and as a political advisor for General Ray 




succeed, which further strained the relationship between the Sunnis and Shi’a.  The 
most prominent obstacle that the Americans faced during the postwar rebuilding 
process was the creation of a new secular Iraqi national identity, which would have 
helped unite Iraqis and shift away from their different sectarian beliefs that divided the 
people.  The division was mainly due to Saddam Hussein’s leadership.  During 
Saddam’s reign, he was able to keep Iraq’s sectarian relationships relatively stable using 
fear, patronage, and other authoritarian practices to ensure the continuation of his 
regime.  Therefore, when the United States removed Saddam and positioned the Shiites 
into power, the opposing sectarian group to Saddam’s Sunni-led government, violence 
was almost guaranteed to erupt between the Sunnis and Shiites at some point.   
Knowing this, the United States could have limited the damage and engaged 
both the Sunnis and the Shiites as equal partners in the rebuilding process from the 
beginning, but the Americans did not follow this policy actions until years into the 
conflict.  Therefore, the inability to understand Iraq made it difficult for the Iraqi people 
to establish a new sense of identity during the timeframe of the conflict, which would 
have provided a stronger likelihood of long-term success.  The process of transitioning a 
government and country into a new identity is a long and difficult process that must 
happen organically and cannot be forced or it will not last.   
This idea of a new Iraqi nationalism would have taken time to achieve, but there 
were positive signs and actions taken by both the Americans and the Iraqi government 
that demonstrated this was possible in 2007-2011.  Sectarian violence decreased 
between the Sunnis and the Shiites, and a new Iraq began to emerge from a sectarian 




and tribal regions, in addition to the increase of American personnel, which will be 
outlined in further detail in Chapter 4.  
In spite of this, in 2011, all remaining American forces withdrew from Iraq, and 
shortly thereafter, the Iraqi government reversed course and continued their practice of 
sectarian persecutions and violence, and chaos eventually ensued once again.  This 
showed that Iraq was on the correct path but needed further American involvement and 
supervision to ensure it would not revert to sectarian persecutions and instability once 
again.  This diminished the potential success in Iraq to create a new sense of Iraqi 
identity and establish a stable and democratic future.   
This paper will seek to answer the question of what caused this conflict to 
become so complicated that the United States efforts are still bogged down today in 
2018.  The main question that needs to be answered is: Could the United States have 
achieved their objectives, and if not, was the result of this conflict and its aftermath the 
result of predisposed characteristics prior to the conflict, or were these problems the 
result of the United States’ own missteps and blunders?        
Going forward, Chapter 1 will discuss the importance that the West has had in 
shaping Iraq’s future and the significance Iraq has had in United States foreign policy 
since the mid-20
th
 century.  This chapter will attempt to explain the relations and reveal 
the tension buildup between the two countries that eventually led to war and the 
removal of Saddam in 2003.  Chapter 2 will discuss the specific policies that harmed the 
United States’ effort to rebuild Iraq.  It will also discuss why these policies hindered the 
creation of a new culture in Iraq and a shift away from sectarian divisions.  Chapter 3 




the success that the United States experienced when US forces began to incorporate the 
Sunnis back into the new Iraqi government, which showed that victory in Iraq was 
possible.  Finally, Chapter 5 will examine the mistakes of the conflict that ultimately 
resulted in a failed conflict for the United States up until 2017.  The goal in this paper is 
to lay out an explanation for why the American government failed to achieve their goals 






















Lead Up to the Iraq War 
The Shaping of Modern Iraq  
Modern involvement by the West in Iraq can be traced back to World War I.  The West 
became involved in the Middle East directly after the end of World War I, which 
influenced the history and future of the Middle East.  This section will discuss precisely 
how foreign involvement shaped the future of Iraq. 
The British invaded the Ottoman Empire, specifically in the land referred to as 
Mesopotamia, modern-day Iraq, in June 1915.  The British army moved towards 
Baghdad to protect their interests and advance their efforts against the Ottoman Empire.  
Several years and roughly 20,000 British causalities later, the British conquered Iraq.  
Following the end of World War I, the British expanded their empire and directly 
influenced the foundations of Iraq.
3
  At the conclusion of WWI, the British and the 
French, under the tense of the League of Nations, divided the Ottoman Empire into 
several regions, called mandates.  The British controlled Palestine (modern day Israel), 
Transjordan, and Iraq, while the French controlled Syria and Lebanon.  This period of 
Iraq’s history is known as the British Mandate Period within Iraq.  
This period of Iraqi history was crucial in shaping the future of Iraq.  During the 
interwar period, the British created the borderlines of Iraq based on three different 
regions within the Mesopotamian region administered by the Ottomans.  The three areas 
brought together to form Iraq were Mosul (north), Basra (south), and Baghdad (central).  
                                                 
3
 William R. Polk, Understanding Iraq: The Whole Sweep of Iraqi History, from Genghis Khans Mongols 
to the Ottoman Turks to the British Mandate to the American Occupation (New York: Harper Collins 




These three geographical regions bordered each other, but these areas shared little 
heritage, culture, and religion.  For example, “the mountainous northern terrain of 
Mosul was linked economically to Anatolia and the Greater Syria, whereas the central 
province of Baghdad supported sedentary agriculture and traded primarily with Iran and 
the southwest, and Basra was oriented toward the Persian Gulf and overseas trade with 
India”.
4
  This new conception of Iraq included more than different economic systems, 
but also included vast cultural and ethnic differences within these different regions. 
This new Iraq created by the British is ethnically and religiously diverse.  
Roughly 80% of the population is Arab, but this population is sharply divided along 
religious lines, while a substantial minority of 20% in the north is Kurdish.
5
  The main 
breakdown of religious lines in Iraq is composed of Sunni and Shi'a Muslims, with an 
estimated 60-65% Shiite and 32-37% Sunni.
6
  Those Iraqi Arabs who identify as a Shi’a 
Muslim maintain close ties with Iran, while the remaining Arabs who identify as Sunni 
keep stronger ties with countries like Saudi Arabia.  The Kurdish people did not identify 
as a part of this new nation and instead viewed the northern land in Iraq, Syria, Turkey, 
and Iran as their ancestral homeland and sought to preserve their language, culture, and 
autonomy.
7
  This showed the vast division within Iraq ethnically and religiously that the 
British and the Americans encountered when rebuilding Iraq.   
In addition to the vast diversity within Iraq, any signs of Ottoman presence in 
Iraq were limited to the major population centers.  This resulted in a decentralized 
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 William L. Cleveland and Martin P. Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East, 6th ed. 




 Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook: IRAQ”, Central Intelligence Agency, January 12, 
2017. 
7




countryside, which resulted in the form of tribal confederations that were accustomed to 
limited government and relative autonomy.  Therefore, it became difficult for the 
British to impose a more centralized government on the rural parts of the country, 
which eventually led to an uprising against British rule in June 1920.
8
  Authors 
Cleveland and Bunton discussed how this rebellion was not a nationalist movement; 
however, the uprising “inspired anti-British sentiment and became enshrined in Iraqi 
national mythology as the first rejection of foreign rule”.
9
                             
During the mandate period, the British placed the Hashemite family in charge of 
Iraq under the rule of King Amir Faysal, son of Sharif Faysal, the leader of the Arab 
Revolt in 1916.  King Faysal ruled with the guidance of British control until 1932, and 
finally, Iraq received independence from the British and became an independent state.  
The Hashemite family maintained power in Iraq until the family under King Faysal II 
was removed from power as the result of a coup in 1958.  The coup resulted in the 
ousting of the Hashemite family from power.  After a decade of instability in Iraq, in 
1968 a coup led by General Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and the Iraqi Regional Branch of 
the Arab Socialist Baath Party occurred, and brought stability to the country under 
Baathist rule.  Saddam Hussein was a major participant in the 1968 coup.  However, in 
the effort to consolidate power and not lose control, Saddam Hussein in 1979 purged 
the Baathist party and leadership, which thrusted Saddam into the primary leadership 
position and solidified his power in Iraq.  Saddam, a Sunni Muslim, led Iraq until the 
United States invaded in March 2003.  
                                                 
8
 Ibid., 195-196. 
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The British involvement influenced Iraqi politics by the creation of an Iraqi 
rejection to foreign rule and secondly by dividing the land from the Ottoman Empire 
into one single entity that had significant political, religious, and ethnic differences, 
which resulted in major ramifications for the future of Iraq.  These conflicts led to 
internal and external struggles within Iraq and its neighbors that are still evident today.                  
United States involvement in the Middle East  
Early signs of modern involvement in the Middle East by the US government can be 
traced to President Eisenhower’s administration and involved every administration 
since World War II.  These administrations actively conducted operations and 
established a presence within the Middle East.  Some examples of the US’s involvement 
in the region can be traced to the CIA supported Coup attempt in Iran in 1953, the 
involvement in the creation of the Baghdad Pact, and the US’s involvement in the Iran-
Iraq War in 1980-1988, to name a few.  This section is meant to highlight some of the 
important events the United States was involved in to help explain the growing 
importance that the Middle East served to the United States.        
In the years leading up to 1979, the United States heavily focused its Middle 
Eastern relationship with Iran.  The United States assisted the British in a coup to 
replace the newly elected Iranian Prime Minister Mossaddeq in 1953 in an effort to 
strengthen the Iranian monarchy under Mohammad Reza Shah’s rule under Operation 
AJAX.  Mossaddeq, who was feared to have had communist tendencies, worried the 
United States that Iran could turn communist, and since this was during the first decade 
of the Cold War, the threat of communism complicated everything.  There was a fear 




Union Charles Bohlen, who believed that “if Persia goes Communist, then Iraq, and the 
rest of the Middle East will also…We ought to concentrate on saving Persia from 
Communism at all costs”.
10
  The United States believed it was in their best interest to 
assist the British in overthrowing Mossaddeq, who wanted to nationalize the Iranian oil 
production, therefore hurt the British’s oil supply, or risk the consequences of a Soviet 
takeover that could include loss of prestige in the Cold War and the loss of the Middle 
East.      
A secondary example of a policy action in the Middle East, to ensure an 
American or Western presence within the region, is the establishment of the Baghdad 
Pact in 1955.  This agreement consisted of Iraq (until 1959), Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, the 
United Kingdom, and to some degree the United States.  Although the Eisenhower 
administration was involved in the negotiations, the United States never officially 
joined but did serve in an advisory role.
11
  The main goal of this agreement was to 
prevent the spread of communism and attempted to create peace in the Middle East.  
After the fall of the Hashemite Dynasty, the headquarters was moved from Baghdad to 
Ankara and the agreement was renamed to the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).  
This organization did not provide a military defense structure, and therefore weakened 
the structure of the alliance, and in 1979 shortly after the removal of the Shah in Iran, 
the alliance disbanded.
12
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 Geoffrey Wawro, Quicksand: Americas Pursuit of Power in the Middle East (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2011), 138. 
11
 "The Baghdad Pact (1955) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)", U.S. Department of State, 
January 2009, accessed January 18, 2018, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/98683.htm. 
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These are just two specific examples taken by the Eisenhower Administration in 
the Middle East, but US involvement in the Middle East did not end with Eisenhower.  
Over the next several decades leading up to the second invasion of Iraq, the United 
States played an influential role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, in Lebanon, and with the 
regimes of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq to name a few.  Therefore, these actions 
fully entrenched the United States in the Middle East politically.  After the fall of the 
Shah in Iran during the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet Union’s invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979, the United States, under the direction of President Jimmy Carter, 
reinforced, with new policy initiatives, the idea of how important the Middle East was 
as a policy objective for the United States in their fight against communism. 
The Carter Doctrine outlined the United States’ position regarding the region 
stating that “an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region 
will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States”, and would be 
“repelled by any means necessary”.
13
  In addition to the change of an American policy 
abroad, the US also sought to build a more substantial presence in the Persian Gulf and 
the Indian Ocean.  As a result of the fall of the Shah in Iran, the Carter Doctrine 
included the creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF).  The 
responsibility of the RDJTF was to respond to threats in the Middle East, serve as 
deterrence for the Soviets within the region, help maintain regional stability, and 
continue the free flow of oil.  The RDJTF eventually morphed into the United States 
Central Command (CENTCOM) in 1983, which is a theater level combatant command 
and is responsible for the Middle East, Northern Africa, and parts of Central Asia. 
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 Andrew J. Bacevich, "The Carter Doctrine at 30”, World Affairs Journal, April 1, 2010, accessed June 




After the 1980 US Presidential Election, Ronald Reagan defeated President 
Jimmy Carter, made an essential addition to the Carter Doctrine that included the 
guaranteed territorial integrity and internal defense for Middle Eastern allies to the 
United States, like Saudi Arabia.  This addition was known as the Reagan Corollary.
14
  
The policy doctrine, as a whole, ushered in a significant change for the United States 
and their presence in the Middle East.  Since the United States issued the Carter 
Doctrine and the Reagan Corollary, Iraq has been a major policy point that the United 
States has had to contend with in the Middle East.   
After the fall of the Shah in Iran in 1979, Saddam became increasingly worried 
that Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution would spread into Iraq and awaken 
Iraq’s Shi’a majority.  While a Shi’a revolution was encouraged by Khomeini, the 
tensions between Iran and Iraq were long standing and covered several issues.  These 
issues also included the question over the northern border between Iraq and Iran and the 
differences between Arab and Persian cultures.  Because of the threat Khomeini posed, 
Khomeini encouraged Iraqi Shiites and the Iraqi military to overthrow Saddam, Saddam 
with the backing of a majority of the Arab world invaded Iran in 1980.  This war would 
cost hundreds of billions of dollars and took several hundred thousand lives.  This 
conflict became a struggle for regional supremacy; therefore, the outcome of the 
conflict drew interest from US officials. 
Diplomatic relations between the US and Iraq were restored in 1984, after 
almost two decades of a severed relationship.  Understanding the importance that this 
conflict had on Middle Eastern supremacy and oil flow, the US became involved in the 
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 William Safire, "The Reagan Corollary”, The New York Times, October 03, 1981, accessed October 




conflict on behalf of Iraq, especially after the US lost an ally in Iran after the 1979 
revolution.  To help ensure an Iraqi victory, after years of stalemate, the US provided 
Iraq with military intelligence, pressured allies not to sell weapons to Iran, and allowed 
Kuwaiti vessels (an ally of Iraq) to sail under a US flag, which in turn would make an 
attack on these vessels equivalent to firing on a US vessel.
15
  The United States viewed 
Saddam as an ally during the 1980s, but two years after the ending of the Iran-Iraq war, 
viewed Saddam as a hostile.  In the 1980s, the main enemy from the Middle East was 
Iran and Ayatollah Khomeini, not Saddam; therefore, the United States ignored 
Saddam’s regime’s brutality and human rights violations in order to prevent the spread 
of Islamic radicalism and an anti-US sentiment that Khomeini represented to other 
Middle Eastern or Gulf states.
16
  This conflict would set Saddam and Iraq on a future 
course, which would ultimately lead to his removal from power in 2003. 
Buildup to the Iraq War 
The second US campaign in Iraq, also known as Operation Iraqi Freedom, was the 
culmination of a long buildup to conflict between the United States and Iraq since the 
Carter Doctrine and after the first engagement between the US and Iraq in the First 
Persian Gulf War.  During the first Gulf War, the United States had an international 
coalition behind them to fight and remove Saddam from Kuwait.  Key officials 
discussed whether to march to Baghdad after Kuwait and remove Saddam from power 
during the George H.W. Bush Administration in 1991.  At that time, former Secretary 
of Defense to President Bush, Dick Cheney, gave an interview to CSPAN in which he 
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described why the United States and coalition forces did not move north from Kuwait 
and remove Saddam from power in 1991. 
In the interview, Bruce Collins asked the former Secretary of Defense whether 
the United States and the United Nations (UN) should have moved to Baghdad and 
removed Saddam from power in 1991.  Cheney discussed the ramifications and the lack 
of international support the United States would have received, especially from the 
Arab world.  Approximately ten years later, this statement turned out to be accurate.  
Cheney warned that if the US and UN forces had moved north and removed Saddam 
from power, then the situation would have resulted in a “quagmire”.
17
  Cheney believed 
that if the US or UN removed the central power of Iraq, Saddam’s authority, then the 
world could have seen pieces of the country fall off and the different states in the 
region, like Iran and Saudi Arabia, would have competed for territorial claim over parts 
of Iraq.
18
  This action would have resulted in instability and chaos within the Middle 
East. 
Over the next nine years, until the invasion in 2003, relations with the United 
States and Iraq were very tense.  This included the establishment of two different no-fly 
zones over various regions in Iraq.  The goal of the established no-fly zones was to 
protect the Iraqi Shiites in the South and the Iraqi Kurds in the North from Saddam and 
his policy of mass killing.
19
  These tense relations also included a change in US policy 
towards Iraq, with the ultimate goal of regime change.  In 1998, after Saddam ordered 
international weapon inspectors to stop working and leave Iraq immediately, President 
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 Dick Cheney, "Quagmire Interview: Do You Think U.S. or U.N. Should Have Gone in", interview by 
Bruce Collins, CSPAN, 1994. 
18
 Ibid.  
19




Clinton and Congress passed into law the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998.
20
  This law made 
it the policy of the US to work towards overthrowing Saddam’s Iraq; one strategy taken 
by the US was to fund Iraqi opposition groups working to oust Saddam with a total of 
100 million dollars.
21
   
These examples showed that the relationship between the United States and Iraq 
has been unstable and tenuous during the years proceeding March 2003.  A significant 
motive for the United States going into Iraq was the threat of a weapon of mass 
destruction (WMD) program.  There was a long history of Saddam’s use of WMDs in 
Iraq.  During the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, Saddam used chemical weapons against the 
Iranian military, as well as his own people.  In 1988, Saddam attacked the Iraqi Kurdish 
town of Halabja using mustard and nerve gas; this resulted in the deaths of thousands of 
innocent civilians.
22
  These actions showed the United States and the international 
community that Saddam had the capability and the will to use a WMD if he felt his 
interests or survival had been challenged.   
Vice President Cheney outlined in his memoir that Saddam was determined to 
add nuclear weapons to his arsenal and that after the Gulf War in 1991; we found that 
his program was much further along than initially believed.
23
  Cheney cited an 
International Atomic Energy Agency report that stated Saddam would have had a 
nuclear device if the Gulf War had not diverted his attention.
24
  Over the next decade, 
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 Ibid., 364.   
23
 Ibid.  
24




following the Gulf War, both American and foreign intelligence agencies agreed that 
Saddam’s goal was to reconstitute its nuclear program covertly.   
In 1999, shortly after President Clinton launched Operation Desert Fox, a four-
day bombing campaign, the purpose of which was to diminish Iraq’s weapon 
capabilities, the US intelligence community assessed that Saddam had revitalized his 
biological weapons program.  Due to the assessment, Saddam was considered a 
legitimate threat to the United States, Middle Eastern allies of the US, or those in the 
Iraqi civilian populace who opposed Saddam’s Baathist ideology or religious identity.  
Vice President Cheney stated after the 2000 election that he and President George W. 
Bush had received daily intelligence reports, which outlined Iraq’s activities and 
capabilities concerning weapons of mass destruction.
25
  Vice President Cheney 
indicated that the content regarding those specific intelligence briefs remained 
classified, but the title was not.  It was called, Iraq: Steadily Pursuing WMD 
Capabilities.
26
  Cheney would use this information to gain support to invade Iraq.   
This belief that Saddam reconstituted his weapons program was not limited to 
the Bush Administration or even President Bush’s Republican Party.  Many other 
important political figures on the opposite side of the aisle to Vice President Cheney or 
President Bush believed in Saddam’s intention to revamp his weapons program.  This 
included a bipartisan congressional letter sent to President Bush in Dec 2001, which 
outlined the threat Saddam posed to the United States.  For example, this letter stated, 
“Reports indicate that biological, chemical and nuclear programs continue apace and 
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may be back to pre-Gulf war status”.
27
  This bipartisan conclusion paralleled many 
beliefs within the administration, different intelligence agencies, and congressional 
leadership at the time.            
 In addition to the belief that Saddam had attempted to revitalize his weapons 
program, the US government also believed that Saddam had aided and provided a safe 
haven for members of al Qaeda after 9/11.  This stems partly from the connection of 
Muhammad Atta, one of the hijackers in the 9/11 attacks, and his alleged trips to 
Prague.  The Czech intelligence community believed that Atta met with Iraqi espionage 
chief Ahmed al-Ani shortly before the 9/11 attacks.  Unverified, the Bush 
Administration used this alleged connection to help persuade the public for war.
28
  In 
addition to the Atta connection, the Bush Administration pushed the Zarqawi 
connection.      
 George Tenet, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, testified before the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on this subject in 2002 and 2003.  In March 
2002, Tenet stated, “We continue to watch Iraq's involvement in terrorists' activities.  
Baghdad has a long history of supporting terrorism, altering its targets to reflect 
changing priorities and goals.  It also had contacts with al Qaeda”.
29
  This message that 
al Qaeda and Saddam had a connection was echoed not only by George Tenet, but also 
by President Bush and others within the administration.   
                                                 
27
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 In September 2002 President Bush stated, “The danger is that al Qaeda 
becomes an extension of Saddam's madness and his hatred and his capacity to extend 
weapons of mass destruction around the world”.
30
  Finally, in February 2003, a month 
before the invasion, George Tenet believed to have confirmed the links between 
Saddam and al Qaeda, saying, “Iraq is harboring senior members of a terrorist network 
led by al-Zarqawi, a close associate of al Qaeda”.
31
  The confirmation displayed by 
Tenet was not an individual belief but a long-standing belief within the US government, 
that there was a strong connection between Saddam and al Qaeda, and that if Iraq 
gained the capability to produce a WMD, Saddam would supply al Qaeda with one.   
Vice President Cheney stated that after the daily intelligence reports regarding 
Iraq’s WMD program, the aftermath of 9/11, and the perceived aid to al Qaeda 
terrorists, the US could not ignore the threat posed by Saddam.
32
  He believed that the 
next potential terror attack could potentially come from a nuclear, biological, or 
chemical threat and Saddam was the most likely culprit to sell and arm al Qaeda with 
these weapons.  Cheney stated in his memoir that “We could not ignore the threat or 
wish it away...The security of our nation and our friends required that we act.  And we 
did”.
33
  The goal was to prevent another attack on the US or our allies’ homelands by 
any means necessary, even if that meant going to war with Saddam in Iraq.  
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The United States had made it their official policy to seek regime change in Iraq 
since 1998; however, in November 2001, after the fall of Kabul, the Bush 
Administration began military preparations to invade Iraq.
34
  As stated earlier, the Bush 
Administration outlined for the American public and the international community 
Saddam’s connection to al Qaeda and the reconstitution of his weapons program.  As 
the United States prepared for war in Iraq, Saddam never took the American threat 
seriously.  David Kay, a weapons inspector, stated, “Saddam never believed the US 
would invade…but more important, he feared the Shiites and Kurds who lived in Iraq.  
He knew they feared him because they thought he had a WMD”.
35
  Saddam believed 
that his biggest threat came from within and that his people would attempt to overthrow 
his regime.   
However, despite Saddam’s denial of having a WMD program and after 
repeated, fruitless negotiations between the UN and Iraq, finally, on 17 March 2003, the 
United States gave Saddam the final ultimatum.  President Bush warned that if Saddam 
and his sons did not leave Iraq in 48 hours, the US would initiate a military conflict 
unilaterally against Saddam Hussein in Iraq.
36
  48 hours later, the United States initiated 
the second war in Iraq.  
The United States initiated the war because they believed that Iraq had a large 
weapon of mass destruction program and stockpile, especially of chemical weapons, 
and they believed there was evidence that Saddam was assisting al Qaeda elements that 
had plans to attack the United States.  However, the United States did not find any large 
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weapon stockpiles that contained or could include a WMD, nor was there any evidence 
of a strong connection between Saddam and bin Laden’s al Qaeda.  David Kay outlined 
that the posturing by Saddam is very common for totalitarian regimes, and “that they 
fear their people more than they fear external threats”.
37
  As a result of the Iraqis’ 
behavior and the belief that they did, in fact, have a WMD program, the international 
community improperly assessed the capability of the Iraqi WMD program.
38
 
This assessment and the discovery that the US lacked any tangible evidence led 
to a political firestorm for the Bush Administration.  Many American and other 
intelligence officials claimed with moderate confidence that it was plausible that 
Saddam did have WMDs, but on the eve of the invasion, transferred those weapons by 
truck into Syria.
39
  James Clapper, the Director of the National Geospatial Intelligence 
Agency, said, “In 2003 that satellite images showed a heavy flow of traffic from Iraq to 
Syria "unquestionably" show that illicit weapons were moved out of Iraq”.
40
  If 
chemical weapons were shipped to Syria from Iraq, this would have made it impossible 
to discover any substantial weapons stockpile in Iraq.  However, there are problems 
with this theory.   
Kris Alexander, former Army officer, discussed this theory of Iraq sending him 
chemical stockpile into Syria and outlined why this theory is incorrect.  First, giving up 
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his WMD stockpile into Syria would have given Saddam a major disadvantage.  
Alexander argued, “It made no sense for Saddam to transfer his weapons of mass 
destruction to Syria.  Saddam worked on acquiring WMD for a reason: to stave off an 
invasion and hold on to power”.
41
  Secondly, the relationship between the Syrians and 
the Iraqi governments were less than ideal.  Alexander raised the question, why would 
Saddam ship weapons to Syria who have strong relations with Iran, Iraq’s main 
competitor and rival in the region, and former enemy of the First Gulf War?
42
  These 
two questions are important and needs to be answered in order to uncover the truth with 
this potential theory.   
Although Alexander posed some important points that question the potential 
theory regarding the Iraqi and Syrian prewar relationship, there are points that still need 
to be addressed.  As discussed earlier, Director Clapper and others saw a massive traffic 
buildup between Iraq and Syria in March 2003.  This is not direct evidence of any 
transfer of WMDs or of any illicit activities, however, at the very least, this does 
challenge Alexander’s narrative and raises the question, what did Iraq transfer to Syria 
on the eve of the Iraq War?  In addition, for the defense of Baghdad, Saddam equipped 
some Republican Guard units with chemical protective gear and authorized the use of 
chemical and biological weapons, according to intelligence reports.
43
  This discussion 
of whether Iraq truly reconstituted their WMD program haunted the Bush 
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Administration for years and was the center of political controversy around the ensuing 
conflict that never left. 
With all the questions that have been raised since the invasion in 2003, many 
considered the assessment of Saddam’s weapons capability and the connection between 
al Qaeda and Iraq as an intelligence failure.  So the question raised is how or why the 
Bush administration failed to receive the correct intelligence prior to leading the United 
States into war with Iraq.  The most plausible answer is that high-level Bush 
Administration officials saw faulty intelligence by the action of “stovepiping”.  
Stovepiping is the action of “receiving information directly to the top 
leadership…without the information subjected to rigorous scrutiny”.
44
  Former National 
Security Council Staff Member, Kenneth Pollack, outlined that this action “dismantled 
the existing filtering process that for fifty years had been preventing policymakers from 
getting bad information”.
45
  Therefore, this raw intelligence made it to key 
policymakers in the administration, like VP Cheney and President Bush, and together 
made the argument for war based on unvetted and unverifiable intelligence.   
Conclusion   
Examining the tense relationship between the United States and Iraq raised the question 
of why Iraq was so important that Saddam was able to force the United States to invest 
such a large portion of their time, blood, and treasure over the last three decades.  One 
factor that continued to draw American interest in Iraq was the continued flow and 
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access of oil from the Persian Gulf.
46
  After the disposal of the Shah in 1979 in Iran, the 
United States needed to create and maintain partnerships within the region to ensure 
their and the world’s continued access.  The United States had built a relationship with 
not only Saudi Arabia, but also Saddam in Iraq.   
The loss of Iran profoundly influenced President Carter to issue the Carter 
Doctrine and succeeding presidents to enforce this policy and, therefore, make the 
Middle East a primary policy concern for their administration.  When Iraq, under 
Saddam’s leadership, became a danger to the United States and its interests, the Bush 
administration had to ensure that the consistent flow of goods, specifically oil, 
continued out of the Persian Gulf and towards the United States’ European allies who 
depended heavily on Middle Eastern oil.  Eventually, it became necessary that if the 
United States wanted to maintain their continued hegemony and security in the world 
and the region, it served their best interests to invade Iraq. 
In April 2003 with one of the most iconic images of the war, the Iraqi civilians 
alongside US personnel tore down the statue of Saddam located in the center of 
Baghdad; this was the symbolic end of the Saddam regime in Iraq.  The actions that 
followed the toppling of Saddam gave rise to the insurgency in Iraq, which eventually 
evolved into a sectarian civil war that the US military would have to deal with for the 
next eight years, which slowed down their peace and rebuilding efforts.  Unfortunately, 
most problems that arose during the conflict escalated because of bad policy, which 
further highlighted the sectarian divisions within Iraq.  
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Postwar Planning and Reconstruction 
What is Postwar Planning and Reconstruction? 
The United States whether at home or abroad has a long record of rebuilding nations 
after conflict; an example is after World War II in Japan and Germany.  The Allied 
Powers planned and had a goal for how postwar Europe would take shape before the 
defeat of Nazi Germany.  These plans, like the Yalta Conference and the Potsdam 
Conference, set the groundwork, which preceded an Allied Victory to ensure a smooth 
transition of power and relative stability during this process.   
The postwar planning definition utilized throughout this chapter will be useful to 
understanding the process.  The definition of postwar planning to be understood going 
forward is the planning stage before a resolution to a conflict occurs that has established 
clear goals regarding a general outlook for what the intervening power hopes the 
occupied nation will look like as a result of the engagement.
47
  This refers specifically 
to how their government takes shape and what it will look like (from the top down).  
However, it is not just limited to a planned change in government, but can also pertain 
to a planned shift in the host nation’s culture and general make-up of their society.   
Reconstruction is more than the actual physical act of rebuilding the damaged 
structures of a country, but also includes the society or social structure that may have 
been destroyed during the conflict.  This key term will have the same general 
understanding and application of reconstruction as postwar Japan in 1945.  The Iraq 
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War reconstruction period includes both the physical rebuilding of tangible objects in 
Iraq but also the actual rebuilding and repairing of the Iraqi political and cultural 
structures of society.  This was done in Japan (the integration of Japan back into the 
world, not just economically, but politically and culturally as well), and the United 
States government also engaged in other reconstruction efforts, such as Panama and 
Kuwait.
48
  The difference between postwar planning and reconstruction is that postwar 
planning merely consists of the plans intended for the future; reconstruction is the 
execution of those proposed plans. 
It is often stated that the United States may have won the war in Iraq, but lost the 
peace.  This chapter will discuss several key policy and decisions that will highlight 
how the Americans mishandled the planning in Iraq, within the lead up to the conflict 
and the immediate months after the fall of Saddam.  These failures by the United States 
increased the difficulty to cultivate a new Iraqi nationalism or identity and shift away 
from their sectarian ideology.  Instead, they highlighted the differences, which further 
exacerbated the negative relationship between the Sunnis and Shiites that already 
existed.   
Early Postwar Planning and Early Reconstruction Efforts 
The Americans and their international partners had to create an effective strategy for a 
post-Saddam Iraq.  Shortly after 9/11, Secretary Rumsfeld ordered the review of the 
current war plans that existed for Iraq.  Rumsfeld did not order the additional planning 
of “Phase IV” or the reconstruction phase, because he did not plan for a lengthy 
                                                 
48





occupation after Saddam’s regime fell while any plan for the reconstruction period was 
presumed by Rumsfeld to have been handled by the Department of State.
49
   
During the planning phase both State and DOD produced assessments for 
possible unforeseen problems during the reconstruction phase.  During this phase Sec. 
Rumsfeld, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Gen. Richard Myers, Vice 
Chairman Gen. Peter Pace, Deputy Sec. Wolfowitz, and Under Sec. Feith developed a 
document dubbed the “Parade of Horribles”.  The “Parade of Horribles” memo 
presented 29 potential problems that the US could encounter during the rebuilding 
process.
50
   
Rumsfeld at an NSC meeting shared this memo with the President, Vice 
President, Sec. State, the National Security Advisor, and the CIA Director.  The fears 
that this group believed could hinder their ability to build a new Iraq proved to be 
accurate.  For example, some of the points within the memo included the fear that there 
were no WMDs; a sectarian and ethnic conflict between the Sunnis, Shi’a, and Kurds, 
postwar involvement lasting longer than 10 years; and the fear that the cost of postwar 
Iraq would drain the US economy and become too expensive.
51
  Similarly to the 
“Parade of Horribles” memo, the State Department participated in their own 
formulation of how postwar Iraq would or could take shape. 
The project funded by the State Department, The Future of Iraq Project, 
attempted to determine before the invasion what tasks needed to be completed to ensure 
a smooth transition, therefore attempting to predict the potential problems the US could 
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encounter during the reconstruction phase.  The Future of Iraq Project drew on the 
knowledge of Iraqi exiles and international experts to predict the issues that the US 
could encounter.
52
  These problems consisted of widespread looting, the threat of 
disbanding the military quickly, the need to rebuild the electric grid and water supply, 
and finally, other potential security threats; however, the warnings from the State 
Department’s study were largely ignored by those in the Pentagon and by some in the 
Executive Branch.
53
   
The project failed to get the attention of DOD or senior State Department policy 
makers for two reasons.  First, The Future of Iraq Project was over 1,000 pages long, so 
it became difficult for policy makers to absorb the information; secondly, the release 
date of the study prevented any influence during interagency deliberations of postwar 
Iraq.
54
  The lack of cooperation between DOD and State frustrated those involved in the 
project because many of the threats the study warned about proved to be accurate, 
similar to the “Parade of Horribles” memo. 
Even with these early signs of contingency planning, within several layers of 
government, the planning for a postwar Iraq was fragmented and missed key 
discussions with different US agencies.  Stuart Bowen discussed in his book, Hard 
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, the loose coordination that the NSC 
(National Security Council) had over the separate State and DOD efforts.  This poor 
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coordination did not just occur between State and DOD but also occurred when this 
effort did not seek the assistance from postwar conflict experts within the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), specifically within the Office of 
Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).
55
  OFDA gained significant experience rebuilding 
after natural disasters but additionally gained experience through operations involving 
Iraq during Desert Storm and Operation Provide Comfort.  Relations between the 
civilian and military planners were fragmented throughout the interagency planning 
process, and even as officials moved to integrate the overall plan, Bowen described the 
integration process developed in a piecemeal fashion and therefore made it difficult to 
combine the different plans as one.
56
  This poor coordination made it difficult to achieve 
a unity of effort between the different agencies and the overall reconstruction effort 
suffered as a result. 
In addition to the poor coordination within the different agencies, there were 
major differences within the NSC as to what a postwar Iraq should look like.  Once the 
removal of Saddam was completed, the next order of business would be the installation 
of a new government to control and operate Iraq.  Two major competing opinions 
emerged.  This first opinion came from within the Secretary of Defense’s office, 
specifically with Douglas Feith and Paul Wolfowitz, who wanted to announce an 
interim government before the invasion.  That plan would have appointed Ahmed 
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Chalabi as head of the new Iraqi provisional government and other exiled anti-Baathist 
Iraqis as heads of other major positions.
57
   
The Americans within the NSC staff that supported an immediate Iraqi-led 
interim government argued two points.  First, that it gave an Iraqi-led face to the 
postwar government; especially since there was no international support, which would 
have helped to prevent the appearance of a Western occupying force.
58
  After the long 
history of Western involvement since World War I in Iraq, any further interference 
would result in adverse side effects for any Western nations.  The second argument, as 
stated earlier, was that an Iraqi-led postwar government without Saddam would be filled 
with exiled anti-Baathists that have been inundated with Western democratic culture.
59
  
This would give the Iraqis control of their government, specifically Iraqis with pro-
western ideals and values that they could teach and could instill in the Iraqi population. 
To the contrary, some members of the NSC staff also had their disagreements 
regarding instituting an Iraqi government immediately following the fall of Saddam’s 
government.  One of the problems with this idea centered around the United States’ 
Iraqi contact, Ahmed Chalabi.  The first problem with instituting a Chalabi led 
government was Chalabi was not trusted among some of the US agencies, particularly 
in the State Department and in the Central Intelligence Agency.  These agencies 
believed Chalabi had a reputation for being unreliable and fraudulent and did not want 
to put someone into power that these agencies did not trust.
60
  Secondly, those within 
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State and the CIA were unsure if the Iraqi people would view that government as 
legitimate because the anti-Saddam exiles have not lived in Iraq for decades.
61
   
The second argument called to establish a government of non-Iraqis for an 
extended period of time; this plan originated in the State Department and State outlined 
a plan for a Transitional Civil Authority (TCA).
62
  The goal of the TCA was for the 
exiled Iraqis to return to Iraq and establish political parties, which would help build 
democratic institutions in Iraq.
63
  Under this plan, the Bush Administration would have 
been able to avoid the unreliable and potentially fraudulent exiles, while using the full 
resources and expertise of not only the US but also the United Nations.  Dyson outlined 
the two significant drawbacks to this solution of governance.  Dyson discussed a TCA 
style government would have gone against the recommendation of the Iraqi exiles that 
wanted self-governance immediately and opposed direct foreign rule and it was unclear 
how much international support the United States would receive.
64
             
The different personalities divided the Administration.  These camps divided 
mostly between the different Deputies at State and Defense, each of whom pushed a 
different policy option and agenda.  In Defense, Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and 
Under Secretary of Policy Douglas Feith argued for a provisional government led by the 
Iraqi exiles.  At State, Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage and Under Secretary Marc 
Grossman pushed for a TCA concept.  Dyson argued that the two sides inherently 
disagreed on the concept for a postwar Iraq government and the relationship between 
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the personalities was too much to overcome.
65
  Therefore, these meetings were 
ultimately unsuccessful between the Deputies and were unable to provide any type of 
recommendation to the Principals Committee (PC). 
The decision to resolve the competing views for postwar Iraq was left to the 
Principals Committee/NSC.  The PC reached two conclusions regarding postwar Iraq.  
The first was that the PC decided to reject the notion of the installation of an Iraqi 
provisional government using Iraqi exiles and instead to adopt the TCA concept.  This 
decision was supported by the PC, and involved Sec. of Defense Rumsfeld to go against 
his number two and three positions at Defense, and side with the State Department and 
the CIA.  Rumsfeld believed that, “if you have a provisional government…you would 
put an enormous amount of power and resources in the hands of these people and they 
may not prove themselves competent or honest”.
66
    
The second decision decided by the PC was that the Department of Defense was 
going to be the lead agency in the postwar.  This included a civilian component headed 
by a non-military “Iraq Coordinator” in addition to a three star.
67
  There was some 
debate over this structure, but eventually the PC agreed on this policy because the DOD 
was the most capable agency to handle the rebuilding of a postwar Iraq.  Sec. of State 
Colin Powell stated, “State does not have the personnel, the capacity, or the size to deal 
with an immediate postwar situation in a foreign country that’s eight thousand miles 
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away”, therefore the State Department agreed with the PC’s decision to make DOD the 
lead agency.
68
   
With the prospect of an extended occupation in Iraq, the United States had to 
prepare for an interim government; therefore, the Bush Administration established the 
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) in December 2002, led 
by Army Lt. General (retired) Jay Garner.
69
  The goal of ORHA was to integrate the 
postwar preplanning between the various agencies and deploy to Iraq to implement the 
plan and establish immediate humanitarian aid after the fall of Saddam’s government.
70
  
However, most of the planning was not integrated by the time ORHA was created.  
Garner outlined in a Frontline interview that “most of it started in October 2002, but 
they were all done in vertical stovepipes of those agencies…integration of those plans 
have not occurred”.
71
  Therefore, ORHA had to integrate the plan between the different 
agencies prior to the invasion of Iraq to ensure a smooth transition to the first 
government after the toppling of Saddam.  ORHA operated and controlled Iraq 
immediately after the removal of Saddam in conjunction with the different military 
divisions acting with relative autonomy within the different zones of occupation, and 
remained in control until the establishment of Iraq’s first government the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA).   
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ORHA was crucial when deciding key plans for Iraq during the early prewar 
planning process.  President Bush and his administration were consulted and eventually 
approved these plans by ORHA.  These decisions included to only deBaathify the top 
layers of the Iraqi government and not disband the Iraqi army, but instead have them go 
home and await the orders to be recalled.  While the decision making process will be 
expanded upon further during each section, it important to note that the government that 
replaced ORHA, the CPA, overturned both of these key decisions and would have a 
lasting impact on how Iraq would unfold.       
Before an Iraqi government was founded, the Bush Administration instituted a 
civilian lead to direct the selection of a transitional government and overtake the 
governmental duties currently responsible by ORHA and the military.  The 
administration selected Paul L. Bremer to take the civilian lead job in Iraq under the 
creation of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).  Bremer was a former Reagan 
counterterrorism director, ambassador to the Netherlands, and worked for the Kissinger 
consulting firm.  This selection was acceptable by both State and Defense, even though 
Bremer had minimal experience in Iraq and did not speak Arabic; however, Bremer’s 
appointment is considered a victory for the State Department.
72
   
As mentioned earlier, there was a division or rivalry between the different 
personalities at the State and Defense Department, and each competed to push their 
agenda for the future of Iraq.  The two rival agencies competed for who would control 
the rebuilding of Iraq, and one avenue was who would control the head leadership 
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position.  DOD’s argument to retain control of the occupation was between a military 
and a civilian lead within the same department, their efforts would be more efficient and 
effective, instead of outsourcing a key component to the equation.
73
  For this position, 
key administration names were suggested by DOD like Wolfowitz, but these names 
were ultimately rejected for Bremer.  However, the State Department believed that Iraq 
needed a civilian leadership, away from the DOD, in order to garner respect from the 
Iraqis, other Arabs, and the international community.
74
  The State Department’s 
argument was ultimately successful and the Bush Administration replaced Gen. Garner 
with Bremer and the CPA.                    
The difference between the personalities within the top level of the Bush 
Administration is critical to understanding why the postwar efforts for Iraq unfolded the 
way they did.  Competing opinions and personalities divided the administration and 
made it unclear which direction the administration wanted to move in.  This confusion 
resulted in an unstable Iraq and only became worse during the CPA’s reign, under 
Bremer.  The following sections will highlight the effects of the poor communication 
between the Bush Administration’s objectives and the CPA/military and the ultimate 
negative effect this relationship had on encouraging further violence in Iraq.             
Security and the Breakdown of Services 
The first area of focus is the breakdown of security and the access to essential amenities 
in Iraq.  This section will examine how the United States lost control of the security 
situation in Iraq during the early days of the conflict before the CPA took over as the 
provisional government.  In addition, the section will highlight how the conflict resulted 
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from poor policy and management, by the Bush Administration, the military, ORHA 
and into the CPA. 











 Marine Division, and the 101
st
 
Airborne Division.  The occupation was divided into different regions or zones in which 
each unit would operate, very similarly to post-WWII Germany.  Each unit was able to 
operate with relative autonomy within their zones in Iraq.  The British took control of 
Basra in the South, the 101
st
 Airborne under Major General David Petraeus controlled 
Mosul, and Tikrit was initially occupied by the 1
st
 Marine Division under Major 
General James Mattis but eventually replaced by the 4
th






 ID had a difficult job within Baghdad compared to other units which 
achieved relative success within their zones.  For example, the British were greeted as 
liberators as they took Basra and freed the Shi’a majority city from Saddam’s tyranny.
76
  
Similarly to the 101st and the 1
st
 Marine Division, both utilized their past knowledge 
and their branches’ historical doctrine to prevent an insurgency before one began.
77
  
However, after the 4
th
 ID replaced the 1
st
 Marine Division on April 19, 2003, the tactics 
and policy within Tikrit, which is a Sunni majority city where a majority of Baathist 
originated from, including Saddam, was treated drastically different.  The 4
th
 ID came 
into Tikrit hard and aggressive, and treated many of the Iraqi civilians as the enemy; 
therefore, this created ill will towards the Americans throughout Iraq and filled the Iraqi 
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prison system.  Many of these policies and tactics used by the 4
th
 ID were adopted 
throughout the early stages of the conflict by accompanying units, which only garnered 
further ill sentiments towards the Americans. 
These tactics were permitted because of the US military’s command structure 
and how Lt. General Ricardo Sanchez, who was the commander of coalition forces 
from 2003-2004, implemented a hands-off approach to policy that allowed the generals 
the freedom to operate with almost full autonomy.  Fishel outlined, “General Sanchez 
did not exercise strong control, so each division operated largely on its own and ran the 
occupation its way”.
78
  The military across the board lacked one cohesive nationwide 
strategy under General Sanchez’s leadership; therefore, the different generals operated 
with autonomy and control over their regions.  This resulted in different perceptions of 
Iraq by coalition forces along with varying perceptions of coalition forces by the Iraqi 
populace, therefore it became difficult to know how to effectively deal with the Iraqi 
people.  Additionally, the Iraqi people viewed the American troops differently based on 
the region of the country, therefore, different perceptions formed about the American 
occupation by the local populace.  This relationship became a vicious cycle and further 
hindered trust and the growth of a strong relationship between the Americans and Iraqi 
people.  It was not until Army General George Casey relieved General Sanchez that one 
nationwide policy was adopted.    
One of these critical perceptions of the early aftermath following the removal of 
the Saddam government came from the 3
rd 
ID.  The experience with the 3
rd
 ID in 
Baghdad is a clear example of the perceived disconnect between the Bush 






Administration’s plan for a post-Saddam Iraq and the military executing those plans.  
The 3
rd
 ID’s after action report (AAR) stated, “The President announced that our 
national goal was regime change…However, there was no timely plan prepared for the 
obvious consequences of a regime change”.
79
  The absence of a Phase IV plan was 
clearly present in the AAR for the 3
rd
 ID.  Because the top leadership failed to provide 
the 3
rd
 ID with guidance, the conditions on the ground deteriorated and a power vacuum 
formed, which allowed violence and chaos to fill it.   
The inability to provide effective command and control from the American 
leadership resulted in an increase of violence that became uncontrollable.  Violence in 
Baghdad occurred, to a degree, because of the refusal of the American military to 
acknowledge occupier status in Baghdad.  This refusal was unusual because every 
divisional commander is supposed to be familiar with the Law of Land Warfare Field 
Manual FM27-10, which states the troops on the ground are responsible for the 
protection and well being of the civilian population.
80
  Regardless, this inaction tied the 
arms of the American military to protect the Iraqi citizens and rebuild Iraq.  According 
to the 3
rd
 ID report, there was no civilian administration to oversee the operation and 
there was no real plan to deal with a post-Saddam Iraq.
81
  A 3
rd
 ID Captain outlined the 
situation as “No one had talked about what would happen when we got there…there 
was no plan for that.  They told us once we got there they would pull us back out and 
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  This was consistent with the reporting from the 3
rd
 ID across the 
board from their leadership. 
Although different divisions reported different circumstances in other regions in 
Iraq, the Bush Administration still had to deal with the problems of violence and chaos 
addressed by the 3
rd
 ID AAR.  The report by the 3
rd
 ID acknowledged that “Without a 
true civilian authority on the ground, commanders were reluctant to move…as they 
were concerned that their actions might be inconsistent with ORHA efforts which either 




  That report 
suggested the Bush Administration needed a plan to fill the void that Saddam’s 
government once held and bring stability back to Iraq.  The United States during the 
postwar planning and reconstruction period attempted to do this with the creation of a 
provisional government, but this was largely unsuccessful.     
The 3
rd
 ID commented in regards to the whole operation that “Despite the virtual 
certainty that the military would accomplish the regime change, there was no plan for 
oversight and reconstruction, even after the division arrived in Baghdad”.
84
  While the 
3
rd
 ID report was their perception of the situation in Baghdad, the reality was that the 
US government did plan for a transition post-Saddam but it was fragmented and 
somewhere the disconnect between the military and the Bush Administration became 
apparent.  This made it difficult for the 3
rd
 ID to accomplish their mission in Baghdad.  
This perception from the 3
rd 
ID could have been influenced by the fragmented 
planning or the lack of a universal plan by the different agencies in the postwar 
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planning process.  The 3
rd 
ID’s recommendation was that “State, Defense, and other 
relevant agencies needed to do a timelier job planning occupation governance and 
standing up a new Iraqi government”.
85
  The fear from the 3
rd
 ID was that Iraq would 
destabilize further and fall into an insurgency; this was in part because of this belief that 
the Bush Administration lacked any sense of urgency in rebuilding Iraq.   
Therefore, the real questions to discuss from the 3
rd 
ID report is what caused the 
sharp disconnect between the military and the Bush Administration.  Why was the plan 
created by the Bush Administration and the different segments of State and DOD not 
communicated effectively to the 3
rd
 ID?  Who was to blame for this breakdown of 
communication?  Was it the fault of the 3
rd
 ID, Gen. Sanchez, allowing too much 
autonomy and not a single plan?  Was it Garner or the bureaucracy as a whole?  These 
questions are difficult to answer and as more time passes maybe the American populace 
will uncover these answers, but for now, there can only be speculation.  However, what 
we do know is that the result of this disconnect escalated the violence and chaos, 
especially in Baghdad, which created the early foundations of an insurgency.  
The civilian side of the operation appeared to be just as disorganized in the 
process to rebuild Iraq as certain Divisions within the military.  Key officials misread 
the situation as it unfolded and therefore continued the administration down the wrong 
policy agenda.  For example, Rumsfeld and the Bush Administration misread the 
conditions on the ground.  Instead of viewing events as they were, which was an 
absence of control and any sense of the rule of law; they read the situation as the Iraqi 
people exercising their right to free will and freedom.  This was a fundamental 
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misunderstanding of the rise in violence and loss of law and order early into the 
reconstruction phase and not only set the US military back tactically, but it also 
damaged the US when trying to rebuild Iraq strategically and therefore created a power 
vacuum that the United States had to fill.
86
   
One of these early signs that the situation in Iraq started to erode was the 
increase of looting, vandalism, and mob attacks on former Baathist government 
buildings in April 2003.  The situation on the ground was described by a Special 
Operations officer as “not hell breaking loose, but it was more of the situation was 
eroding”.
87
  As the situation began to erode, senior Bush Administration officials had a 
different perception of what this meant.  For example, Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld’s response to the looting and the slow unraveling of Iraq was “Stuff 
happens!”
88
  Rumsfeld described the situation in Iraq by saying, “freedom is untidy, and 
free people are free to make mistakes and commit crimes”.
89
 
The result of looting and the lack of law and order played a crucial role in the 
early stages of Iraq.  The failure to address the situation from the onset established a 
weak relationship with the Iraqi people and created a power vacuum that Sunni and 
Shi’a insurgent groups attempted to fill.  The commanders and the CPA did not take 
initial measures to stop the violence and chaos; therefore, this created confusion on the 
ground between coalition forces and the Iraqi civilians.  Examples of these actions 
would have included an imposed curfew on the population, civilians directed back to 
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work, and a tighter control of local governments and the populace.
90
  Because the US 
failed to acknowledge the role as an occupier in Iraq, and only as a liberator, the US 
took a hands-off approach to the governing of Iraq and as a result, Iraq plunged into 
chaos. 
In addition to the looting, one issue not accounted for was the actions of the 
Iraqi civilians.  Coalition forces tried to provide electricity and water to the Iraqi people 
but experienced troubles delivering those essentials.  For an intervening power to gain 
the support of the local populace, the intervening power needs to provide essential 
goods and services to maintain support within the region.  Larry Diamond, an academic 
advisor to Bremer at the CPA noted, “Electric grids could not be revived, oil facilities 
could not be repaired, reconstruction jobs could not be commissioned, supplies could 
not be delivered…moreover, a transition to democracy could not move forward because 
of the pervasive criminal and insurgent violence”.
91
  Therefore, when security 
conditions on the ground deteriorated, this negatively influenced the socio-economic 
condition of Iraq and created unnecessary obstacles for the Americans to overcome.   
The Americans were unable to provide these essential services to the Iraqi 
people consistently not only because of the confusion within the US government’s 
bureaucracy but additionally because of saboteurs and criminal insurgents within Iraq.  
American and coalition leadership became frustrated with the lawlessness in Iraq, and 
every time American and other coalition contractors repaired Iraq’s infrastructure 
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capability, saboteurs blew up the installations and stole the copper piping.
92
  What made 
matters worse was that the Americans within the Green Zone, the governmental district 
of the CPA and the remnants of any international presence, did not have this problem.  
There was a clear difference between those who lived and operated within the Green 
Zone and those who did not.   
An example of this disconnect between those who lived and operated in the 
Green Zone and those who did not was a civilian named Walid Khalid.  Khalid owned 
and operated a pizzeria right outside of the Green Zone, and his story showed a stark 
difference between these two places.  Khalid’s store, because of the electricity rations, 
would only receive 12 hours of power per day, once the Americans arrived.  He 
outlined with his fellow business neighbors that the electricity problem “was never like 
this before”.
93
  He alluded that his company operated better when Saddam was in power 
compared to after the arrival and establishment of the Green Zone by the United States.  
This ruined his business venture.  The Iraqis who watched the Americans have 
unlimited access to electricity and air conditioning, especially on those days that 
reached 130 degrees, lacked the same luxuries, creating discontent between the people 
and the Americans.  
 In addition to the lack of consistent electricity, the Iraqis’ food and water were 
in short supply from April to June 2003.  This led to mass starvation and a percentage of 
the population getting sick from unpurified water sources; most alternative sources, 
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such as bottled water, became too expensive for the average Iraqi.
94
  This added to the 
eroding situation on the ground in Iraq, which was discussed earlier by Special 
Operations forces and others in Iraq and made it difficult for the Iraqis to trust the 
Americans in the early beginning years.   
What can effectively be determined at the conclusion of this section are the early 
foundations that began to build an insurgency, which would eventually evolve into a 
sectarian civil war.  The chaos; the inability to provide essential services and goods, like 
AC, water, and electricity to the Iraqi populace; and a poor command structure all set 
the stage for the policy blunders committed by the CPA under Paul Bremer’s 
leadership.   
DeBaathification 
When ORHA ended, the United States and coalition forces established the CPA to fill 
the power vacuum created after the removal of Iraq’s central authority, Saddam 
Hussein.  An American, Paul Bremer, led the CPA; and he held this position until the 
CPA stepped down from power and handed the government over to the provisional 
Iraqi government.  Paul Bremer only led Iraq for one year, but within that year, Iraq 
became unstable, and the US and coalition forces had to contend with an insurgency by 
the end of his term.  
When Bremer took control of the CPA and control of Iraq, the CPA issued 100 
orders.  However, the first two caused the most damage to the coalition’s efforts in Iraq.  
Order number I issued by Bremer was the CPA’s decision for deBaathification of the 
Iraqi government.  DeBaathification was a very similar process to what the Allied 
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Forces did to the Nazis after their surrender in World War II; this process is known as 
de-Nazification.
95
  DeBaathification was the process of “removing the holders of public 




Saddam, a Baathist, outlined his government structure by enforcing the 
condition to Iraqi citizens looking for state employment that they had to be a member of 
the Baathist political party to obtain employment.  This gave Saddam the ability to 
manipulate the population and made it easier to kill dissidents when necessary.  For this 
reason, Bremer and others like Feith and Wolfowitz went against the previous decision 
established before the war began and decided that a process of radical deBaathification 
was needed going forward in a post-Saddam government.   
Many believed that the deBaathification process would follow the successful 
path that the Americans and Allied forces did during the deNazification process within 
Germany.  Many similarities between the two scenarios pushed Bremer into instituting 
this policy to the degree he ordered.  Saddam and the Baathists controlled both the 
political life in Iraq and Iraq’s society through a police state and a mismanaged corrupt 
command economy.
97
  There were other similarities within the structure and recruitment 
process.  Members were expected to attend weekly indoctrination meetings and were 
required to recruit children as informers first (to inform on friends, family, neighbors) 
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and then eventually into the party itself.
98
  This was very similar to how the Nazis and 
the Soviets operated.  However, these cases followed different paths and were not 
similar because of their internal divisions. 
Initially, the Bush Administration gave the perception to coalition forces and the 
exiled Iraqis that the plan was to remove those who violated human rights or those 
considered to be weapons abusers; this was the focus compared to those Baathists just 
deemed to be corrupt.
99
  The general understanding was that the coalition would retain a 
significant number of Iraqis in their current position.  This would allow Iraq to keep 
their bureaucratic structure and operate a functional government to provide basic 
amenities to the people, but would remove those who was believed to still have loyalty 
to Saddam and the Baathist ideology. 
 Jens Meierhenrich discussed the initial postwar deBaathification plan by the 
United States in the article.  Largely, the plan was that the “broad structures of 
bureaucracy would remain in place...the coalition would cut off the head of the snake 
but leave the body”.
100
  This was the initial plan because the exiled Iraqis argued that 
although the infrastructure was aging, they were still serviceable; therefore, this came as 
quite a shock to the coalition postwar planning organization when the action to 
eliminate all of the Baathists was accepted as policy.
101
   
The initial plan regarding the deBaathification of the Iraqi government was to 
allow the Iraqis to take control of the situation themselves.  Colonel Paul Hughes, 
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Garner’s strategy chief, recalled the original plan, on which Garner briefed both 
President Bush and Rumsfeld.  Col. Hughes recalled, “Let the Iraqis sort out their own 
deBaathification, the Iraqis will either kill them or force them to leave”.
102
  This 
appeared to be the plan going forward until Bremer arrived in Iraq and implemented the 
Office of Special Plans’
103
 (OSP) policy and deBaathified the entire country. 
However, the directive for deBaathification was introduced and created in the 
Office of Special Plans, led by Douglas Feith and Deputy SECDEF Paul Wolfowitz.  
This order was created before Bremer’s appointment, but Bremer implemented the plan.  
At the time, Paul Wolfowitz was the Deputy Secretary of Defense (the number 2 
position in Department of Defense), and Douglas Feith was Under Secretary of Defense 
of Policy (USD-P).  Bremer decided to issue the directive, which is why he is the 
highlight of the discussion regarding the deBaathification of Iraq and not Feith or 
Wolfowitz.  However, instead, Bremer disbanded the government’s infrastructure and 
removed state employees not considered under this category. 
In an interview with PBS Frontline, Bremer defended his action of issuing the 
deBaathification.  In the interview he stated, “I did that because I thought it was 
absolutely essential to make it clear that the Baathist ideology, which had been 
responsible for so many of the human-rights abuses and mistreatment of the people in 
their country over the last 40 years, had to be extirpated finally and completely from 
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  Bremer claimed that the directive only focused on the top Baathists who 
were clear violators of Iraqi human rights; however, the reality of the situation and the 
intended goal of the directive resulted in two different outcomes.
105
 
Both Garner and the CIA station chief urged Bremer to reconsider the 
overreaching deBaathification process, but Bremer’s response was simply, “Absolutely 
not, I have my instructions, and I am going to issue this”.
106
  This made Garner believe 
Bremer was not responsible for the content of the policies produced by the CPA, but 
instead just followed DOD directives.  In the hopes of avoiding confusion, President 
Bush agreed to “give Bremer supreme authority over all US actions in Iraq; Bremer 
was, in effect, the US Viceroy in Iraq”.
107
  However, even with this declaration and 
support given by the President, another problem with the CPA was the disorganization 
of the power structure between the military and the CPA. 
This policy action by the CPA had a devastating result on Iraq but also on US 
and Iraqi relations.  Because the Baath Party was so deeply engrained into the Iraqi 
workforce, this resulted in an increased level of mistrust and dissatisfaction by the Iraqi 
populace towards the United States and the CPA, which laid the foundation for a cause 
of the insurgency.  Therefore, the decision to clean house from the CPA eventually 
destabilized the newly freed Iraq.  Specifically, the CPA “introduced a sweeping, 
indiscriminate deBaathification process intended to rid the country of the Baath party's 
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  This process removed people from their positions at all levels based on 
party affiliation, rather than the actual conduct of the individual.   
The result of the deBaathification devastated Iraq’s economy and society.  
Bremer’s action led to the unemployment of tens of thousands, which led to hatred and 
disdain towards the American government and Bremer.  One of the largest departments 
affected by the CPA’s deBaathification process was the Ministry of Education.  It was 
reported, “The Ministry of Education was staffed by more senior party members than 
any other department, and suffered 16,149 dismissals by June 2004.  Another 1,355 
were removed over the next 16 months”.
109
  This caused many Iraqis to become 
unemployed, and to the Iraqis, the Americans were to blame. 
This policy affected Iraqi families and communities and eventually led to the 
rise of social and political disturbances in Iraq.  An example of Iraqi displeasure was 
Zalmay Khalilzad
110
 in April 2003; a senior State Department political appointee and 
was a leader in a State Department project called the Future of Iraq Project discussed 
earlier.  Khalilzad voiced his displeasure, which echoed throughout Iraq by stating, 
“Iraqis, as a society, must decide how to treat differently those who led the crimes of the 
past regime…those who joined the Baath party at the lowest levels and are not 
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necessarily culpable for any crimes”.
111
  Khalilzad believed that those Iraqi civil 
servants who in the past had done their best to serve their country, not Saddam’s 
tyranny, should not have been let go for merely having the same party identification as 
Saddam, which was mandatory.
112
  Even though Khalilzad’s opinions had major 
influence within the Bush Administration and the Republican Party, because of his 
regional expertise, his concerns went largely ignored at the time. 
An important question is why were influential players like Khalilzad and Garner 
ignored during the deBaathification decision?  One theory is that exiled Shiites had a 
strong influence on key figures, like Feith and Wolfowitz, and were able to push the 
administration towards the removal of anyone who could challenge their new vision for 
Iraq.  It was clear that Feith and Wolfowitz wanted the exiles to take power, especially 
under Chalabi’s leadership; therefore, it is not a reach to believe that even after the 
decision to create the CPA was made, Chalabi still had the ear of important figures 
within the Administration.  Nir Rosen, author of Aftermath, argued the decision to 
deBaathify Iraq was very political from the beginning and that Chalabi in effect used 
the process to target political opponents and de-Sunnified Iraq.
113
  Chalabi believed that 
this would have helped him become Prime Minister of Iraq, however, the exiles and 
Chalabi had very little support in the new Iraq.   
A second theory regarding why Iraq was deBaathified the way it was an attempt 
to rid Iraq of a Baathist ideology.  Bremer and Wolfowitz often compared the Baathist 
Party to the Nazi Party and said that Saddam had modeled his regime after Hitler’s 
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regime.  Rosen put in his book Aftermath, that “there is no proof or mention in any 
literature about Iraq” regarding the connection or model of Iraq and the Baath Party 
after Nazi Germany.
114
  Therefore, Rosen argued this belief is partly why Bremer 
performed so poorly in Iraq; he viewed Iraq through a distorted lens.
115
  These two 
theories might help explain why the CPA Order I was issued that caused so much 
destabilization in Iraq’s managerial and working class.    
This process of deBaathification affected all of Iraq and was an influential factor 
in the Iraqis becoming disenfranchised, which then made many join the insurgency.  
This type of policy pushed Sunnis out of government and out of power and replaced 
them with Shiites, and this made it difficult for the Sunnis to accept this new Iraq.  
Therefore, Iraq became near impossible during the early years to cultivate a new Iraqi 
sense of nationalism for all Iraqis to support, which would have helped repair the 
relationships between the Sunnis and Shiites that decades of persecution and violence 
created.  This policy action by the CPA increased the level of mistrust and 
dissatisfaction by the Sunni Iraqis towards the United States and the CPA.  The result of 
the American government picking different sectarian groups as winners and losers set 
the foundation for mistrust that expanded the insurgency, which eventually morphed 
into a sectarian civil war.  
Disbanding the Iraqi Military 
During the rebuilding of Iraq, the United States had to decide how to handle the current 
Iraqi military.  This section will look into how the CPA issued Order Number II, 
attempt to answer how this policy changed and contradicted the initial policy 
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established by ORHA and the Bush Administration, and finally examine the overall 
effects that this policy had on Iraq in the early postwar phase.  Bremer’s second order 
was the official disbanding of the Iraqi military, not just Saddam’s top military and 
police enforcers like the Republican Guard (which President Bush approved of in the 
March meetings).  In hindsight, one can observe the clear negative effects that this 
policy had during the early years rebuilding Iraq.  Therefore, in addition to poor policy, 
the disbanding of the military lacked the appearance of coordination, cooperation, or 
even a unified message between the CPA and the Bush Administration.   
The Bush Administration, initially in their postwar planning phase, prepared to 
employ several hundred thousand former Iraqi military members on the United States 
payroll to help provide security, ensure order, guard the Iraqi border, repair roads, and 
perform any other unforeseen tasks in Iraq.
116
  Pfiffner outlined how “many officers in 
the Army were professional soldiers, and the rank and file enlisted soldiers constituted a 
source of stability and order.  The disbanding threw hundreds of thousands out of work 
and immediately created a large pool of unemployed and armed men who felt 
humiliated and hostile to the US occupiers”.
117
  Therefore, when Bremer’s order 
ignored the recommendation of the postwar planners, the US Army, the Army War 
College, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, all of which advised 
against officially disbanding the Iraqi military, left many questioning Bremer’s decision 
and how the decision became reversed.
118
  This order had real implications for the 
future of the occupation and in the early days after the order caused an eruption of 
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violent demonstrations that resulted in the wounding of American soldiers in the 
attempt to put down the violent demonstrations.
119
      
Officials within the CPA, like Walter Slocombe, Senior Advisor for Security 
and Defense to the CPA, believed that this was necessary to establish a new Iraq.
 120
  
Slocombe argued that “the move was necessary to establish an Iraqi military not tainted 
by corruption and was acceptable to ethnic groups that had long been repressed by 
Saddam Hussein's military’…He also says that ‘it was the only possible course because 
so many Iraqi soldiers had fled their posts and drifted back into the population”.
121
  The 
goal of the CPA was to leave little doubt to the Iraqis that there would be any traces of 
Saddam left, and two important policies that needed to be enacted according to Bremer 
and Slocombe is a clearing of Iraq’s public sector (deBaathification) and the disbanding 
and rebuilding of Iraq’s military/police force.   
Bremer and Slocombe believed that the Iraqi Army would be tough to 
reconstitute, because they had deserted their posts and surrendered to the Americans on 
arrival.  This idea could have been correct, but many disagree with this notion presented 
by Bremer and Slocombe, and instead believe it offered as an excuse.  This theory 
regarding that statement existed because this order was such a critical miscalculation by 
Bremer and the CPA and that the perceived difficulty is used as a possible defense to 
protect themselves and their reputation for the effects of this bad policy.   
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Bremer and Slocombe were correct in that the Iraqi military did disband and 
returned to their homes armed; however, Slocombe and Bremer misunderstood two 
important facts about the Iraqi military and the situation on the ground.  First, the 
general structure of the military would have still been intact with the help of key Iraqi 
military officers.  Many within the Iraqi military returned home immediately after the 
invasion, and this had a lot to do with American psychological operations (PSYOPs) 
that started about a year before the invasion.  Pfiffner tells us that the US “dropped 
leaflets over the country that warned the Iraqi army not to fight the US invasion or 
destroy the oil fields.  The leaflets promised that if Iraqis refused to fight for Saddam, 
the soldiers would be accepted back into a post-Saddam Iraq army”, but this was not the 
case.
122
   
In addition to the leaflets, leading up to the war senior American military 
leadership met with former Iraqi officers to discuss the best way to rebuild and recall 
the Iraqi military.  General Abizaid approached former Iraqi generals about returning to 
duty and assisting in the postwar security, Pfiffner pointed out that Gen. Abizaid 
received a positive response.
123
  In fact, Col. Paul Hughes began negotiations with the 
former members of the Iraqi Army and former officers and by mid-May (prior to the 
order) had 137,000 former Iraqi soldiers registered to join in the postwar security 
force.
124
  However, Bremer instituted the CPA Order II, and ordered a cease to all 
negotiations with the Iraqi military.  Col. Hughes stated, "We changed from being a 
liberator to an occupier with that single decision…By abolishing the army, we 
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destroyed in the Iraqi mind the last symbol of sovereignty they could recognize and as a 
result created a significant part of the resistance".
125
    
Lieutenant General David McKiernan, the Joint Force Land Component 
Commander (JFLCC) during the time of the Iraq invasion (post-invasion Gen. 
McKiernan was replaced by General Sanchez), believed that the desertions did not 
mean the Iraqi military had disbanded.  In reality, Gen. McKiernan believed the military 
could be reconstituted if the US recalled the soldiers and key leaders who commanded 
them.
126
  Pfiffner pointed out that Tenet in his book, At the Center of the Storm, 
believed that “Intelligence estimates indicated that the majority of the army could have 
been recalled within a two-week period and put to useful work”.
127
  This challenged the 
notion presented by Bremer and Slocombe and this idea was the idea of many others 
within the Administration.     
For example, Colin Powell believed that “The troops might have been gone, but 
there was a structure there, there were units, there was an infrastructure.  Get rid of the 
officers who were Saddamites, and rebuild it from a structure that existed, not from 
ground zero”.
128
  Additionally, Bob Woodward in Plan of Attack outlined how senior 
officers in six key Iraqi divisions agreed to stay out of the fight and surrender their 
forces upon the United States’ invasion and that this act created high hopes in the 
capitulation strategy in which these units would be used for stabilization efforts.
129
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Both of these add more credence to the idea presented by Tenet, Hughes, and Pfiffner 
while detracting credibility away from Bremer and Slocombe.  Therefore, if the United 
States successfully commissioned the Iraqi military, as planned, this would have given 
the US a key ally in the rebuilding process immediately, helped answer the troop-level 
concerns proposed by some within the military, and provided the occupation with a 
much-needed Iraqi presence.  However, the CPA reversed this order. 
Secondly, Bremer and Slocombe misunderstood how the Iraqi government had 
built the military.  The Sunnis may have controlled Iraq during Saddam’s reign; 
however, Iraq still had a heavily dominated Shiite population, which meant many within 
the military were Shiites.  Rosen in Aftermath pointed out that why the Sunnis and the 
Baath Party controlled Iraq, the Iraqi population was proud of their military and viewed 
the military as a nationalistic icon, one that predated the Baath Party.
130
  Another claim 
by Bremer that Rosen attempted to debunk was the idea about Shiite advancement in 
the military.  Rosen claimed that while the Sunnis overrepresented the officer corps and 
that many Shiites felt that there was a glass ceiling in promotions, roughly one third of 
the famous deck of cards of Iraq’s most wanted were Shiites.
131
  This showed that while 
the Shiites were underrepresented, Shiites still had some mobility in the military and 
that the regular military was not just a Sunni haven and a tool for Saddam’s 
persecutions.                
The next problem with the CPA’s order is this order directly contradicted the 
plans established by the Bush Administration and ORHA on March 10-12, 2003.  This 
breakdown of communication began when Bremer arrived in Iraq in May to replace Jay 
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Garner who oversaw the situation in Iraq before the fall of Saddam’s government to the 
implementation of the CPA in May.  While Garner was in Iraq, Garner and Bremer 
were tasked to rebuild Iraq together.  Garner and Bremer quickly developed a negative 
relationship with each other, which made it difficult to accomplish the mission.  
Because of their relationship, Garner, who had originally told Rumsfeld that he would 
be willing to stay in Iraq until July 2003, left early.  Garner outlined how “Bremer did 
not want my advice…He cut me out the first day, and did not have me attend any of his 
meetings”.
132
  This relationship is not productive when trying to rebuild a nation, and 
Iraq suffered because of Bremer’s actions not only with Garner but also with many 
people in the military and the Bush Administration.   
One of the clearest examples of the disunity and delicate relationship between 
Garner and Bremer and Bremer and the Bush Administration was the disbanding of the 
military.  The Bush Administration decided on March 10-12
th
 during postwar 
discussions not to officially disband the military, but the CPA under Bremer’s 
leadership decided that was the best option, and went ahead and implemented this 
policy to the shock of many within the administration and military sector.  In an 
interview regarding postwar Iraq, former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage 
stated regarding the policy decision of Bremer, specifically referring to the disbanding 
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This shock was discussed with important figures within the principals 
committee.  For example, Secretary of State Colin Powell was surprised, and so was 
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice.  Powell is quoted to have said, “I talked 
to Rice and said, ‘Condi, what happened?’…And her reaction was: ‘I was surprised too, 
but it is a decision that has been made, and the President is standing behind Jerry’s 
decision.  Jerry is the guy on the ground.  And there was no further debate about it”.
134
  
This change in policy excluded key members of the Bush Administration, like Powell 
and key leadership in the military, which caused additional problems for the 
administration and created confusion over who had approved Bremer to disband the 
military. 
Pfiffner claimed that this order did not clear the normal policy process and that 
“Feith admitted he did not bring it (disbanding the military) up in the deputies meetings 
but said that he had received detailed comments back from the JCS.  But Richard B. 
Myers, Chair of Joint Chiefs then, said: I don’t recall having a robust debate about this 
issue, and I would have recalled this”.
135
  Pfiffner goes on through his article, US 
Blunders in Iraq: De-Baathification and Disbanding the Army, to discuss the other 
important policymakers or military personnel who should have been consulted with and 
were not or personnel that have lingering questions remain over their involvement in the 
policy decision.  For example:  
Army Col. Greg Gardner, was tasked by Slocombe to get 
General McKiernan’s reaction to the plan the day before 
it was issued…Gardner said that a member of 
McKiernan’s staff told him over the phone that 
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McKiernan accepted the policy decision.  McKiernan, 
however, denies that he was consulted: ‘I never saw that 
order and never concurred.  That is absolutely false’.  
Gen. Peter Pace, vice chair of JCS said, ‘We were not 
asked for a recommendation or for advice’.  Central 
Command in Florida was also surprised by the decision.  
Paul Pillar, National Intelligence Officer for the Near East 
and South Asia, said that the intelligence community was 
not consulted about the decision.
136
 
Therefore, Pfiffner and others showed an overall lack of communication across the 
entire government.  This shocked not only key principals like Colin Powell but key 
members in the military who were responsible for planning Iraq during the postwar 
period.  It is impossible to tell, however, my belief is Bremer, Slocombe, and Feith were 
motivated by egotistical and personality reasons, which blinded their view on strong 
policy.  
However, since that decision Bremer wrote a New York Times Op-Ed piece in 
September 2007 in which he painted a much different story regarding the debate over 
the disbanding of the military.  Bremer discussed in his Op-Ed that after consultation 
with American officials in Washington and Baghdad the only viable course of action 
was to disband the military and create a new professional force open to the hire of 
former Iraqi military.  Bremer added how Walter Slocombe drafted an order to 
accomplish these objectives.  Bremer stated how he “sent a preliminary draft of this 
order to the Secretary of Defense and the next day sent the draft to the Defense 
Department’s general counsel, William J. Haynes, as well as to Mr. Wolfowitz; the 
under secretary for policy, Douglas Feith; the head of Central Command, Gen. Tommy 










The Op-Ed continued to outline exactly how the decision to disband the military 
was deliberated and thoroughly discussed before the order became official.  Bremer 
claimed to have had meetings with President Bush regarding this issue, but President 
Bush did not recall any these meetings or agreeing to this change.  Additionally, 
Slocombe claimed to have received comments on the draft, which incorporated the 
views of both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which 
would have made it clear that both top civilian and military staff in the Pentagon 
reviewed the proposal.
138
  Additionally, Bremer claimed to have given the New York 
Times letters that show President Bush approved the order to disband the military, 
however the Times disproved that claim.
139
  Regardless, whatever the case may 
potentially be, critical staff members across the Bush Administration either lied 
regarding their knowledge of the directive or were left in the dark.  Both are 
unproductive during an attempt to rebuild and restructure a government and military 
and this communication breakdown started with the Bush Administration and went all 
the way down the chain of command.  However, the more likely truth is that Bremer, 
Feith, and Slocombe decided to contradict initially agreed upon decisions and when the 
three were caught, lied about their actions. 
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The chain of command in Iraq was a major concern in the post-planning effort.  
On May 9, Bremer received an order from Sec. Rumsfeld with the position of 
“Presidential Special Envoy to Iraq” as described earlier.  This power gave Bremer “full 
authority over US government personnel, activities, and funds”, which was very similar 
but meant to exclude control over major military operations.
140
  The second designation 
issued was Sec. Rumsfeld’s appointment of Bremer to be the Administrator of the CPA, 
which gave him full executive, legislative, and judicial authority in Iraq.
141
  However, 
due to the ambiguity of the designations to Bremer, conflict arose between himself and 
Sanchez over who had command of the military within Iraq (very similar to the 
conflicts that arise in the military about the role of an ambassador in a conflict zone).  
Sec. Rumsfeld could have easily resolved this problem if he had offered a clear chain of 
command between the military and the CPA, but he failed to do so.       
Fishel outlined that because these posts were given to Bremer, it resulted in two 
separate and independent chains of command within the DOD structure.  He stated, 
“The first was the chain of command structure from the president through SECDEF and 
Feith to Bremer.  The second was the president through SECDEF and CJCS to the 
CENTCOM commander to Gen. Sanchez as commanding officer of the Combined Joint 
Task Force-7 (CJTF-7)”.
142
  Because both chains of command were independent within 
the DOD, this resulted in disputes between Bremer and Sanchez over who was in 
charge of the military component within Iraq.  
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Bremer eventually reversed the decision and decided to rebuild the military 
slowly and methodically battalion by battalion.  However, the damage was already 
done, and when the order to disband of the military was issued, those formerly in the 
Iraqi military joined the newly formed insurgency, which gave a new sense of 
legitimacy to the insurgency.  What were once initially a few Saddam Fedayeen fighters 
eventually turned into a full-blown insurgency, with the armed Iraqi regulars looking to 
oust the Americans from Iraq.
143
  Therefore, after the effects of this policy were noticed, 
the blame game among policy makers began for the implementation of a policy that 
legitimized the insurgency. 
Overall, this situation regarding the disbanding of the military revealed that the 
United States did not have a unified message, did not have accountability within the 
Administration, or did not have a proper discussion between the administration, the 
military, and the CPA.  For example, Bremer claimed that President Bush knew prior, 
but Bush claimed not to have remembered, and Bremer claimed to have received 
support from the Defense Department but the Secretary of Defense barely dealt with 
Bremer.  Therefore, this added more confusion during the early months of the war in 
Iraq and this is just one example where proper communication lacked throughout this 
decision making process.    
Examining this decision making process several questions come to mind, such 
as whether or not Bremer made this decision on his own.  Second, if Bremer did not 
make the unilateral decision to disband the military, who else was involved?  Finally, 
why was there such poor coordination between the military, the CPA, and the Bush 






Administration?  There are several plausible theories or assumptions as to what 
happened and how the decision was made, but it can be difficult to know exactly what 
occurred and certain assumptions have to be made in order to put together the clearest 
picture possible.  Therefore, for most of these questions, we will never know the full 
truth.  Instead, as memoirs are released from the authors’ perspective and material 
becomes declassified, the US populace will then be able to create a clearer and better 
understanding of what happened, but it is unlikely the American people will ever know 
the full story behind this order.   
What we do know and what was presented in this section is that there was a lack 
of a unified message and accountability throughout the entire decision-making process 
regarding the disbanding of the military.  Somewhere the decision between President 
Bush’s initial order to keep the Iraqi military intact became misunderstood or ignored.  
When examining the effects of the CPA’s first two orders, the deBaathification order 
and the disbandment of the military, both had a devastating role in early postwar Iraq.  
Both policies created high unemployment and disdain towards the Americans in Iraq.  
These policies left many Iraqis without jobs, who then blamed the United States for 
their deprivations and struggles.  It is hard to decide which policy had a more influential 
role in the creation of the insurgency; however, more than likely the official disbanding 
of the military had a stronger effect.  This order sent thousands of armed Iraqis 
underground with a grudge towards the US, which gave strength and momentum to an 
insurgency of Iraqi regulars. 




The operation to rebuild Iraq was understaffed and underfunded on the junior level and 
in military strength.  The Bush Administration was unwilling to commit the needed 
forces to ensure a stable postwar Iraq.  In February 2003, before the invasion, Army 
Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki testified on Capitol Hill where he estimated 
“several hundred thousand” soldiers would be needed in a successful postwar Iraq; this 
number directly contradicted the numbers provided by Paul Wolfowitz and the 
Pentagon, which estimated 100,000 American troops.
144
  This led to more infighting 
among key members of the Bush Administration and other vital officials.  This 
contradiction raised more suspicions regarding the continuity between the Bush 
Administration and the military.  This number was never reached and was the center of 
controversy during the lead up and early months of the war.   
The US and coalition forces did not just suffer from lack of proper 
communication regarding troop strength but also in deployment.  Due to an unsteady 
relationship between the United States and Turkey, the Americans were unable to get 
enough men in at the start of the conflict
145
, and as a result, fewer than half of the men 
required to ensure a stable Iraq were in Iraq when Baghdad fell.
146
  It was clear that the 
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 ID was scheduled to invade Iraq from Turkey, however, the Turkish government denied 
permission to the American military to invade from the North.  Therefore, the 4
th
 ID had to make their 
way through Kuwait and were able to join the fight and the occupation for the end of major combat 
operations.  The Turkish denial of US forces into Iraq from the north has been cited as a potential 
attributing factor for a strengthened insurgency.  Hendrickson and Tucker claimed that if the US attacked 
from the north, they may have been able to march across the Sunni Triangle of Death and quelled any 
Baathist resistance before it became stronger.    
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operation was understaffed; however, the problem ran deeper than just the deployment 
of more American soldiers to Iraq. 
Two authors, Hendrickson and Tucker, are unfavorable to the theory that if the 
United States had deployed more men, then specific problems would not have arisen.  
These authors make the assertion that if the operation had been staffed properly, Iraq 
would have still experienced violence.  While this assertion is likely correct to a degree, 
a larger troop total would have been able to maintain control and defuse the anarchic 
nature of Iraq, while securing the Iraqi borders, which were unguarded for the first year 
of the conflict.  At the time, the Americans would not have been able to deploy 
300,000-480,000, roughly the number estimated by Shinseki and others, especially 
without a heavy reliance on National Guard and Reserve forces.
147
   
The only feasible way in 2003 to obtain those numbers estimated would have 
been to create a sizeable coalition willing to contribute fighting men.  The initial prewar 
plan from the Pentagon called for a sizeable contribution from foreign allies.  This plan 
called for four divisions; these four would have been from NATO, Great Britain, 
Poland, and the Arab Emirates.
148
  Hendrickson and Tucker described the situation by 
saying that the Americans “made the meal” and removed Saddam, while the 
international forces “did the dishes” or assisted in the rebuilding of Iraq.
149
  However, 
only British and Polish divisions were available, and a potential reason for this was the 
failure to gain international support and the absence of a UN authorization.
150
  In 
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addition, the Iraqi forces sent home and later disbanded could have provided the 
additional security needed within Iraq and would have given the operation an Iraqi face.   
Secondly, staffing the CPA was a significant blunder by Bremer and the 
Americans.  Fishel detailed in his book, American National Security Policy: Authorities, 
Institutions, and Cases, that Bremer hired senior staff personnel he knew from his time 
at the State Department.  While Bremer filled his senior positions with former 
ambassadors or senior level State Department employees, for junior positions, Bremer 
pursued a different method.  A majority of Bremer’s junior staff were recent masters 
degree graduates, recommended by the Heritage Foundation, with little to no field 
experience.
151
  These graduates had little knowledge of the region and the language, 
which certainly caused problems for the CPA in their attempt to rebuild Iraq. 
The United States, from a military standpoint, deposed Saddam brilliantly.  
However, because of the lack of a coherent and unified message, the proper 
preparations before the operation to remove Saddam, and poor leadership throughout, a 
chaotic and anarchic Iraq resulted.  Colin Powell, US Secretary of State in 2003, 
compared the situation in Iraq to the popular home-furnishing store, Pottery Barn, and 
this policy metaphor he described operates by a rule that says if you break it, you own 
it.
152
  The “Pottery Barn rule of foreign policy” is just a simple way of describing when 
an intervening force takes over; the intervening power will become responsible for the 
safety and security of the population.  Therefore, within the analogy, Collin Powell 
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stated that the United States was now responsible for fixing the dilemma they had 
created and could not withdraw as planned. 
Restoring Iraq’s Ability to Govern 
Eventually the Americans would no longer govern the Iraqi people; therefore, some 
semblance of Iraqi governance would have to be established in order to lead Iraq in a 
post-Saddam and US-led government.  These plans worked to restore Iraq’s national, 
regional, and local governments.  After Bremer arrived in Iraq, he tasked his team with 
establishing an Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) as an early step to transfer political 
power back to the Iraqis.  The IGC served in an advisory role until sovereignty was 
transferred back over to an established Iraqi government.  Rajiv Chandrasekaran, author 
of Imperial Life in the Emerald City, believes that the CPA attempted to engage in 
social engineering by favoring the Shiites and Kurds over the Sunnis.  The CPA 
implemented strict ethnic or religious quotas on the IGC; therefore, the IGC members 
comprised of thirteen Shiite Arabs, five Sunni Arabs, five Sunni Kurds, one Christian, 
and one Turkmen.
153
  While Iraq was already ethnically and religiously diverse before 
the invasion, the establishment of an ethnically and religiously based IGC similar to one 
from a troubled system, such as the one in Lebanon, divided the government and the 
populace from the start. 
Some Iraqis, particularly Saad Jawad, a professor at Baghdad University, 
believed that this system negatively impacted the early foundations of Iraq.  Jawad 
believed that some Iraqis at the time placed national identity over religious or ethnic 
affiliation, and that “we never saw each other as Sunnis or Shiites first, we were Iraqis 
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first…but the Americans changed that and they made it a point to categorize people as 
Sunni, Shiite, or Kurd”.
154
  While this was not always the case or even the case among 
many across Iraq; however, some did share the same sentiment as Jawad.  The CPA 
chose five relatively weak Sunnis to sit on the council and excluded low-level Baath 
Party members from consideration, which further alienated the Sunnis and raised 
tensions between the Sunni populace and the Americans.
155
  If the IGC would have 
placed better-qualified personnel on the council or if the Americans had chosen stronger 
Sunni candidates, the Sunnis may have felt that they had a stronger voice in the new 
Iraq  
Conclusion  
This chapter examined the policy decisions, which led to the rise of an insurgency and 
eventual sectarian civil war during the Iraq war.  The deBaathification process and the 
disbandment of the Iraqi military led to conditions that were more conducive to the 
existence of an insurgency, while the security conditions on the ground allowed for 
chaos, which gave the insurgency the ability to flourish.  The deBaathification and the 
dissolution of the Iraqi military resulted in hundreds of thousands becoming 
unemployed, and unemployment is a major characteristic that Young and Gray looked 
into regarding economic conditions needed for an insurgency to flourish.  
Specifically, these authors discussed that “The political aim of insurgencies 
thrived in situations where societal divisions were cumulative and were combined with 
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economic and political disparities”.
156
  These economic divisions discussed were “a 
rising unemployment and underemployment (rate), unequal distribution of wealth, and 
inadequate distribution of essential goods”.
157
  They argued that these factors would 
lead to dissatisfaction and that it would open the door to insurgent action and guerrilla 
warfare.  Therefore, because of these policies discussed in this chapter, the United 
States now had to face an insurgency in Iraq. 
These actions created a near certainty that during the first year of occupation the 
initial sparks of the insurgency by the remaining Baathists and ex-soldiers would rebel 
against a US occupation.  Therefore, as time elapsed, the attacks became more militarily 
advanced and showed clear signs of professionalism.
158
  As the attacks increased in 
their intensity and capabilities, the Americans ramped up their efforts to stop the 
violence.  However, American soldiers found themselves in a position of breaking Iraqi 




It is difficult to argue that the United States would not have faced an insurgency, 
because history has shown most invading countries tend to experience some form of 
insurgent activity, however these attacks could have mitigated.  If the US government 
and the CPA had handled their relationship with Saddam’s former officers better, it is 
not unreasonable to believe the insurgency could have been less violent and 
destabilizing, especially since some insurgents were former Iraqi military who the CPA 
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had relieved of duty.  However, these policies and mistakes resulted in a manifestation 
of hatred towards the American and coalition forces; this contradicted the belief that the 
US government and their international partners would be greeted as liberators instead of 
occupiers.  This resentment towards the US made it difficult to build a new national 
identity in Iraq, and the Iraqi populace’s resentment can be directly related to US policy 
actions, and not relations between the Sunnis and Shiites, especially in the first few 
years of the conflict.  The American presence in Iraq unified many Iraqis with a 
common enemy, the United States, which in the early years of the war united the 
different insurgent groups and Iraqis with a common goal.  Therefore, the conflict faced 
the result not of predestined political conditions but instead specific policy actions taken 

















Rise of an Insurgency and Sectarian Violence 
Chapter 2 outlined the policies and planning in the months that preceded and the 
months that followed the invasion and how the actions and the policies of the 
administration impacted the early stages of Iraqi reconstruction.  The chapter discussed 
the shift in Iraq away from a potential stable and democratic future but instead towards 
violence and eventual civil war.  The change resulted from a series of incorrect policies 
or failures within the administration that aggravated the religious and ethnic divisions in 
Iraq.  Therefore, this chapter will discuss the result of these policies and the actions 
taken by the United States, which eventually caused the rise of an insurgency and 
ultimately a sectarian civil war.                     
What is an Insurgency and Counterinsurgency:  
An insurgency is, “a general overarching concept that refers to a conflict between a 
government and an out group or opponent in which the latter uses both political 
resources and violence to change, reformulate, or challenge legitimacy” of the current 
administration.
160
  However, an Australian counterinsurgency expert, David Kilcullen, 
gives us an additional understanding of what this term means.  The definition he uses 
when understanding an insurgency is, “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow 
of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict”.
161
  The 
second Iraq War after the fall of Saddam is a strong example of this.  An insurgent 
group led by al Qaeda, former Baathist, and Saddam loyalists attempted to challenge the 
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legitimacy of the United States’ involvement in Iraq, and the newly formed Iraqi 
government after the transition from the CPA. 
British Colonel C.E. Callwell wrote one of the original doctrines when 
encountering a small war or counterinsurgency operation (COIN).  Callwell's idea sets 
the standard for what would be considered a small war or a counterinsurgency 
operation.  The United States and other foreign militaries used his teachings from his 
book and his definition of a small war to guide policy.  Callwell’s book was very 
influential in creating the US Army and US Marine Corps’ doctrine regarding their fight 
in a “small war” or counterinsurgency operations.  The evidence is the field manuals 
created by the Marines in 1940, which General Mattis drew from extensively, as did 
Army General Petraeus in 2006.  
Callwell defined a small war as “anything other than a conflict that consists of 
regular troops”, but more specifically, he denotes this type of conflict as “operations of 
a regular, conventional army, against an irregular, or comparatively speaking, irregular 
force”.
162
  Colonel Callwell specifically noted that a “small war” has nothing to do with 
the size and scope of the conflict but instead the actors that are involved in the conflict.  
Using this understanding of the term, the first Gulf War from 1990-1991 and the initial 
invasion of Iraq in March 2003, until the fall of Saddam’s regime in April 2003, would 
not be considered a “small war” by Callwell’s definition.  However, the growing 
insurgency in Iraq, after the fall of the Saddam regime, is an example of Callwell’s 
“small war” concept.   
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Another way of looking at counterinsurgency is the host government alongside 
an intervening/occupying power or by itself with the purpose of defeating the insurgent 
organization and returning the status to normal.
163
  If the host government is successful 
but refuses to acknowledge the underlying issues that created the conditions for the 
insurgency in the first place, then that allows the same situation to reform, and another 
insurgency would soon follow.  After Saddam’s regime had fallen, it became apparent 
that there was going to be an insurgency in Iraq, so the United States and coalition 
forces took counterinsurgency measures to create a stable and safe Iraq.  The occupying 
power or host government has several options they can consider to defeat an insurgency 
that forms in their controlled territory.  These measures adopted by an 
intervening/occupying power are primarily based on the use of force (military strength), 
economic coercion, or forcing the insurgent’s hand politically.
164
         
A protracted counterinsurgency operation is very costly for any occupying or 
intervening power.  An insurgency is very cheap to operate because the key objective is 
to promote disorder and fear throughout their areas of operation, which is comparatively 
very inexpensive.
165
  Disorder serves many purposes.  For example, it can help disrupt 
an economy and create discontent; both of these factors serve the overall purpose of 
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undermining the strength and authority of the counterinsurgency operation.
166
  The Iraqi 
insurgency effectively drew the US deeper into the conflict, spending more US lives 
and treasure and becoming an obvious example of cost disparity between the US and 
the insurgent groups.  
Kilcullen argued that to operate a successful counterinsurgency operation, two 
important fundamental factors must be understood.  These factors are respect for 
noncombatants and understanding what drives the conflict, which implies a constant 
need for diligence and updating of policy, based on changing circumstances on the 
ground.
167
  The United States adopted these concepts put forth by Kilcullen; however, 
this took time for the Americans to implement, and therefore, the situation worsened.       
Sectarian and Ethnic Breakdown in Iraq 
As discussed before, Iraq is a very diverse country that consists of three major ethnic or 
sectarian divisions.  The two major ethnic groups that comprise Iraq are the Arabs and 
the Kurds.  As of 2016, the Arab population constituted roughly 75-80% of Iraq’s ethnic 
groups, compared to the Kurds who comprise anywhere from 15-20% of the 
population.
168
  Besides an ethnically diverse state between the Kurds and Arabs, Iraq is 
diverse within the two sects of Islam.       
According to the CIA, roughly 99% of the Iraqi population follows and practices 
a form of the Islamic faith.
169
  The two major sects of Islam, the Sunnis and the Shi'a, 
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resulted from the schism that occurred after the death of Mohammed in the 7
th
 century.  
From the two sects of Islam, Sunni and Shi'a, the Iraqi population is roughly 60-65% 
Shiite and 32-37% Sunni.
170
  The major reason for the split was a disagreement over 
who would become Caliph within the Muslim leadership after Mohammed.  One side 
believed that the Caliph should be a consensus choice, while the others believed that the 
Caliph should be a descendant of Mohammed.  Since then the two sects have been at 
conflict with each other.        
A sectarian division has always existed in Iraq long before the American 
invasion.  However, since the invasion the situation has become much worse.  Since the 
capture of Mesopotamia by the Ottomans in 1638, the minority Sunnis had always been 
the ruling party in Iraq.
171
  After the fall of the Ottomans after World War I, the British 
took control and continued that status of the Sunnis as the ruling party, while the Shiites 
largely remained in rural and labor classes in Iraq.
172
  The relationship between the two 
became more challenging and complicated after the Shiites began to move into the 
urban areas in the 1950s. 
The relationship between the Sunnis and Shiites did not cause a big problem, 
and the two sects appeared to coexist relatively well, until the Iran-Iraq War.  There was 
sectarian bias before the war.  However, it did not truly get worse until after the start of 
the 1980s.  During the conflict, the regional powers, like Saudi Arabia, expected Iraq to 
be the Sunni defense against Iranian Shiite expansion throughout the Middle East; 
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however, this became a source of tension within Iraq, especially in the Shiite 
intelligence and security establishments.
173
  The discrimination against the Shiite 
population, which was encouraged by Saddam, resulted in a massive exiled class and 
migration of Iraqi Shiites out of Iraq, even though these Shiites fought against the 
Shiite-dominated Iran and identified more as Iraqis.  Saddam believed that the Shiite 
Iraqis were Iranian and confused nationality and ethnicity with religion, which became 
a problem the US had to face when attempting to foster a new identity away from 
religious lines and towards a more secular belief system.  
This sectarian divide became a problem for the United States during the duration 
of the conflict Iraq.  Differences between sectarian ideologies were a significant factor 
in the rise of violence in Iraq.  Political or religious ideology can divide a populace, and 
Iraq is a strong example of that.  Violence increased from insurgent groups, and besides 
targeting US troops, they also targeted competing religious groups.  David Galula 
discussed the overall power and effect an ideology has on the rise and creation of an 
insurgency or civil war.  He argued that for an insurgent group to be successful they 
needed to have a well-grounded cause and ideology to attract supporters from the 
population.
174
  Their ideology and resolve must be strong enough to overcome the 
certain weaknesses that will arise for insurgent groups, and in Iraq, the different 
insurgent groups’ pursuits outlasted the weakness in the early years.                     
Who Comprised the Insurgency?  








In 2003, the US and other coalition forces faced the first major attack of an Iraqi 
insurgency.  Many different organizations comprised the insurgency and fought against 
coalition forces.  The major groups that encompassed this insurgency were 
secular/nationalist groups, Islamic organizations, a combination of both nationalist and 
religious factions, and finally foreign influence and fighters.  By June 2006, NPR posted 
an article that revealed all of the major insurgent groups fighting in Iraq against 
coalition forces at the time, which is based on Ahmed S. Hashim’s book, Insurgency, 
and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq.
175
  Hashim concluded, “There are a remarkable 
number of insurgent organizations.  They vary widely in levels of skill and functional 
specialization….This chaotic situation has proven to be a major problem for effective 
intelligence-gathering about the insurgency, its methods, and goals”.
176
  
Saddam Loyalist  
The first major organization is the Sunni Baathists; and the example of this group 
outlined by Hashim is The General Command of the Armed Forces, Resistance, and 
Liberation in Iraq and the Fedayeen Saddam.
177
  These organizations comprised of 
mostly Saddam’s former regular soldiers that were promised a role in the new Iraq 
before the CPA disbanded their jobs and Saddam’s Republican Guard, who were 
always going to be disbanded.  Therefore, the members that composed these 
organizations tended to be those who had suffered from the Coalition’s occupation.  
However, because of the disbanding of the military, and the fact that thousands deserted 
their posts before the fall of Iraq, organizations were still armed with weapons given to 
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them by the Saddam regime and would use them against coalition forces.  This gave 
them more legitimacy and made it more difficult for coalition forces to contend with the 
eroding situation on the ground. 
Before Saddam’s capture in December 2003, their initial goal was to restore the 
former Baathist government and to have the coalition abandon their mission in Iraq.
178
  
The pre-war organization of the Baath Party allowed for these militias loyal to Saddam 
to continue to operate a guerilla-type insurgency.
179
  However, after the capture of 
Saddam, these organizations had less credibility and therefore, changed from a more 
nationalist identity about liberating Iraq from a Western ideology to a more Islamist-
dominated motive.
180
   
Sunni Insurgents  
The next major insurgent faction was the Sunni Islamists.  These fighters were primarily 
under the ideology of Salafi Islam.  A Salafist is an individual who follows an ultra-
orthodox form of Islam where they live in the manner of the Prophet Mohammed and 
fight for a return of what they consider a pure form of Islam.
181
  Practicing as a Salafist 
is very similar to the Wahabi sect of Islam, which is popular in nearby Saudi Arabia that 
has connections with Osama bin Laden; however, the major difference is that Salafists 
“in Iraq do not condone tolerance towards the Shi'a Muslims” a tactic that groups like 
AQI and later ISIS practiced.
182
  The most popular insurgent organization with these 
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factors is the Islamic Army of Iraq (IAI).  Hashim described the members of IAI as 
“people who will not surrender.  That they have time, they have weapons, they have 
money, and they are fighting at home”.  Hashim goes on to state that, “I am afraid it 
will only get worse, that they will get more and more power”.
183
  IAI was involved in 
the insurgency in Iraq until the coalition withdrew in 2011.   
In 2006 after the bombing of the Samarra Mosque, it became clear that Iraq was 
engulfed in a sectarian civil war, and a new organization in Iraq emerged called al 
Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).  AQI, led by Jordanian Sunni Islamist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, 
specifically attacked the Shi’a population in Iraq.  AQI was a separate organization, but 
was still affiliated with Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda that the United States was fighting 
in Afghanistan.  However, there was a fundamental difference between the two 
organizations.  Bin Laden viewed the United States and practicing Muslims who ruled 
and understood the world in a more secular manner as the real enemy, compared to 
Zarqawi and AQI, who viewed the Shi’a interpretation of Islam as the real threat.  This 
resulted in attacks across Iraq towards Shi’a Muslims because of the perception that this 
would be the best strategy to defeat the United States and the result of these attacks 
inspired a retaliatory conflict between the two sectarian groups.   
AQI’s main goal during Zarqawi’s leadership was twofold: first, to rid Iraq of 
the Americans and establish an Islamic government, and the second was to take the 
fight out of Iraq and into the Middle East, specifically Jerusalem.  Zarqawi outlined that 
in order to bring about coups in neighboring Middle Eastern countries, AQI first had to 
establish an Islamic government.  Zarqawi believed that the rescuing of “Jerusalem and 






the neighboring countries will come only after the rise of an Islamic state from which 
the youth will set out to liberate the neighboring areas”.
184
  This involvement by AQI 
and other Sunni Islamist organizations set out to rid the Americans from Iraq, expel the 
Shi’a government from power, and establish a Sunni-led government, once again.  
This changed the dynamic of the conflict in two ways.  The first way the 
dynamic changed was, it moved away from a classic insurgency towards a civil war 
between the two major sectarian ideologies in Iraq.  Secondly, this caused further 
foreign involvement between the Saudis and the Iranians in regional competition for 
influence in Iraq.  This competition further exacerbated regional rivalries and worsened 
the relations between the Sunnis and Shiites that lived in Iraq.  As a result of the change 
in nature of the conflict, the United States failed to deal with the change effectively and 
struggled to make any progress under General Casey’s leadership.        
Shi’a Militias             
With the emergence of AQI and violence towards the Shi’a population, a Shi’a response 
materialized.  However, before the 2006 bombing, Shi’a insurgent organizations 
existed, most notably, The Mahdi Army and the Supreme Council for Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).  The Mahdi Army took their roots from Shi’a cleric 
Muqtada al-Sadr, and this group took form in 2003 to protect Shi’a communities from 
Sunni insurgents due to the collapse of “public order” after the invasion by the United 
States.
185
  The Mahdi Army had an adamant anti-US sentiment and demanded a 
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withdrawal and a timetable for the removal of foreign troops in Iraq.  Al- Sadr told Al 
Jazeera “the Mahdi Army will only disarm when an administration that can ‘get the 
occupier out of Iraq’ is present” and that they could liberate Iraq.
186
  It is important to 
note that  
The Mahdi Army primarily focused their efforts in the southeastern part of Iraq because 
of the small Sunni population and minimal al Qaeda activity and therefore actively 
resisted US occupation efforts within this region.
187
  The Mahdi Army sought US 
removal from Iraq immediately, and in 2007 the US accused Iran of arming, supplying, 
and training Shi’a groups like the Mahdi Army in the effort to gain a further foothold in 
an already chaotic Iraq.  The Iranians became a state sponsor of terrorism in favor of 
Shi’a organizations and became an opposition intervening power in the war against the 
Americans and the coalition forces.   
Groups like the Mahdi Army were involved in not only the targeting of US 
personnel but also in sectarian violence and death squads against Sunni insurgents and 
the local Sunni populace.  Their goal, with the support of the Iranian government, was 
to make Iraq a Shi’a-led and dominated state, and with the help of Iran, these 
organizations caused further chaos and disruption a to the growing situation in Iraq.  
This group continued to cause problems for the United States until the ceasefire in 
2008.  One conclusion discussed for why groups like the Mahdi Army began to lose 
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influence was that al-Sadr began to shift away from violence and prioritized his 
organization's cultural, religious, and socio-economic outreach.
188
 
A competing Shi’a organization was the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq 
(ISCI), previously known as Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).  
After the fall of Saddam, the ISCI quickly began to consolidate power and became an 
influential political player in the new Iraq by providing goods and services to the Shi’a 
Iraqis.  During the civil war in Iraq, the ISCI military wing, the Badr Brigade, was 
accused of secret killings and death squads against Sunnis throughout Iraq.
189
  Much 
like the Mahdi Army, ISCI received money and supplies from the Iranians to rid Iraq of 
Sunni and American influence and became a proxy for Iranian interests.  This created 
additional problems for the Americans in the effort to rebuild Iraq. 
Foreign Fighters  
The final major insurgent group was comprised of foreign fighters.  As early as 2003, 
the United States has had to “contend with fighters from across the region, particularly 
Syrians, Saudis, Yemenis, Algerians, Lebanese, and even Chechens”.
190
  This problem 
became so noticeable that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated, regarding 
foreign fighters, “We know that busloads were coming in with money and recruiting 
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posters…I am sure there are people still coming in from neighboring countries, and it is 
something that's obviously unhelpful”.
191
   
What the presence of foreign fighters showed is twofold.  First, the number of 
fighters in Iraq revealed that the insurgency had a degree of organization behind the 
fight against the American and Western presence.
192
  Secondly, it showed that a threat 
emerged against coalition forces.  Authors Gordon and Jehl discussed how busloads of 
fighters across the region looked for an opportunity to kill Americans, in the effort to 
get coalition forces to abandon Iraq and the Middle East.
193
   
These insurgent organizations and the influx of foreign fighters developed 
because of the destabilizing and disenfranchising policies instituted during the early 
months in Iraq.  These policies caused hatred by many Iraqis and Arabs in the Middle 
East regarding American and coalition forces’ presence in Iraq.  This made many within 
the region believe that American involvement was just another example of Western 
influence and dominance over their land and decisions, which was very reminiscent of 
the Middle East’s complicated past with the British and French.  Therefore, when 
looking at the characteristics that gave rise to the insurgency, the biggest causes were 
the result of poor American policies and poor execution.  
US Counterinsurgency Plan 
From 2003 to 2006, coalition troops lost considerable ground and potentially lost the 
war to insurgent groups because of the US military’s tactics, which eventually evolved 
the conflict towards a sectarian civil war.  After the invasion in 2003, the United States 
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quickly toppled Saddam’s Baathist regime and to prevent a power vacuum from 
forming, the US created the Coalition Provisional Authority, and the interim 
government of Iraq.  Paul Bremer, who was discussed earlier, was assigned as the 
leader of the CPA and responsible for reestablishing a governing body in Iraq.  This 
government’s main purpose was to distribute services back to the Iraqi people, like 
security and other essential amenities.
194
  This was all in the hope that this would 
prevent an insurgency and allow the rebuilding of a strong and independent Iraq. 
However, due to actions taken by Saddam before the invasion as well as actions 
by the CPA, several paramilitary groups, established by Saddam, were able to continue 
the fight against the United States.  Saddam also ordered before the invasion that his 
forces gather weapons, food, and other supplies and store them throughout the 
country.
195
  These efforts made before the invasion were in the hopes that Iraq would be 
able to draw the United States into a prolonged insurgency against coalition forces.  
Saddam’s efforts were ultimately successful.     
After an occupation of several months, the Iraqi people and American forces 
settled in and worked towards building a new future for Iraq.  In August 2003, the CPA 
released a public relations document, ironically the day after the bombing of the 
Jordanian Embassy that suffered over 60 causalities.  This document highlighted the 
progress that Iraq experienced and their road to a stable democracy.
196
  The White 
House claimed that these attacks only occurred in isolated regions of the country, when 
in fact, the insurgency was widespread and developed well before that attack.  This was 
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the administration’s attempt to downplay the violence in the effort to maintain support 
at home.        
Initially, insurgent attacks did not exclusively focus on US personnel.  Instead, 
the insurgent groups focused on allies and others supporting components to the 
American effort, which they believed legitimized the occupation.
197
  Lt. General 
Ricardo Sanchez, who was the commander of coalition forces in 2003-2004, saw a four-
pronged attack by the insurgents against American, Iraqi, and other coalition forces.  
Gen. Sanchez stated, “They were doing direct action against us.  They were attacking 
the Iraqi security forces, as they existed at the time.  They were attacking politicians.  
They were attacking the international coalition, and they were looking to split the 
coalition”.
198
  In other words, the insurgents focused on other targets, deemed softer 
than American hard targets, because they believed these were easier to hit and would 
caused support to peel away from the Americans and disrupt their efforts rebuilding 
Iraq.  That is exactly what happened, and a strong example of this was the bombing at 
the International Red Cross in Baghdad.  A suicide bomber, in the disguise of an 
ambulance, drove up to the International Red Cross in Baghdad and detonated a bomb, 
killing roughly 40 people, a mix of Americans and Iraqis.
199
  Jack Straw, Secretary of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in the UK, reacted with “shock and 
outrage” to the Red Cross attack and stated, “The fact that terrorists have yet again 











targeted not US or UK troops but an international organization...shows the depth of 
depravity to which they stoop”.
200
      
These attacks showed the world that an insurgency had formed since the 
invasion ended and Bush declared an end to all major combat operations in May of 
2003.  Shortly after that declaration, the conditions in Iraq completely turned against 
coalition forces.  Initially, by the end of midsummer in Iraq, the Americans’ initial plan 
was to reduce the troop commitment to 30,000.  However, because of conditions on the 
ground, that was not possible.  During the years that Lt. Gen. Sanchez led the United 
States military, the operation in Iraq lacked an overall counterinsurgency (COIN) 
strategy; therefore, coalition forces focused on tactical attacks.
201
  Examples of these 
measures were door-to-door raids and patrols throughout Iraq.  These responses were 
very predictable and ineffective over time against the insurgents, and the result of these 
tactics was widely unsuccessful, and this is an effect of an enemy-centric strategy.      
In addition to poor tactics, the American and coalition forces had repeatedly 
received poor and inaccurate intelligence.  Thomas Ricks outlined this situation in his 
book Fiasco.  Ricks pointed out how the Americans all summer long (2003) had poor 
intelligence and months into the conflict they had no idea who the enemy was and what 
the Iraqis thought of the Americans.
202
  This would make it difficult to fight a 
counterinsurgency conflict as the enemy was not clear, their capabilities were not clear, 
and what the local populace believed about the intervening powers’ involvement in their 
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country was not clear.  This is basic COIN theory that the Americans did not utilize 
when fighting during the early years of this conflict.   
American forces lacked basic information in Iraq that would have assisted in the 
progress of their COIN operation, but the American military conducted the conflict in a 
way that violated many basic principles of a proper counterinsurgency operation.  Ricks 
stated, “It appeared the only lesson the American military learned from the Vietnam 
War was that it should not get involved in messy counterinsurgencies”.
203
  This was 
evident by the military’s lack of implementation of true counterinsurgency tactics, and 
instead applied tactics that directly contradicted an effective COIN.  
An essential text regarding counterinsurgency tactics was completed by 
Lieutenant Colonel David Galula in 1964 called Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory 
and Practice.  Based on the methods implemented to deal with the violence in Iraq, it is 
likely that this text and the tactical content were virtually unknown throughout the US’s 
military upper leadership in 2003.  For example, Galula prescribed a very different 
approach when dealing with insurgents than the American military took.  The US 
military used large-scale conventional tactics when dealing with Iraq, but as Galula 
described, this method is not effective for a long-term operation.  LT Col. Galula stated:  
True, systematic large-scale operations, because of their very size, alleviate 
somewhat the intelligence and mobility deficiency of the counterinsurgent.  
Nevertheless, conventional operations by themselves have at best no more effect than a 
fly swatter.  Some guerrillas are bound to be caught, but new recruits will replace them 
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as fast as they are lost.
204
  Essentially, what Lt. Col. Galula meant by this is that 
although with a larger footprint, the intervening power would be able to gain the 
advantage in the short term because of the intel picked up, this is not a long-term 
solution because the intel can change and can be too narrow or focused.  This same 
principle is mimicked in both Col. Callwell’s text in Small Wars: Their Principles and 
Practice and the US Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual.      
Another direct contradiction of an effective COIN operation the American 
military did not utilize, which hindered their ability to control Iraq, was their control of 
the border.  This is also a policy outlined by Lt. Col. Galula.  Galula stated, “The border 
areas are a permanent source of weakness for the counterinsurgent whatever his 
administrative structures and this advantage is usually exploited by the insurgent, 
especially in the initial violent stages of the insurgency”.
205
  This is what occurred in 
Iraq.  The insurgents within the earliest stages of the Iraqi occupation, after violence 
erupted, took advantage of both the Syrian and Iranian borders with Iraq.  Not only was 
there an influx of foreign fighters sneaking into Iraq from Syria, as outlined earlier, but 
the Iraqi insurgents could also alleviate their pressure and escape when needed.  
Additionally, the lack of control on the Iranian border allowed the Iranians to influence 
the future of Iraq and arm the Shi’a insurgents with a lot more ease.  It took the 
American military far too long to secure the Iraqi border, and the US suffered because 
of that fact. 
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One senior Department of Defense official stated, “There are clearly more 
foreign fighters in the country than we ever knew, and they are popping up all over”.
206
  
During the last month of the Saddam regime, foreign fighters, mainly Syrians, were 
welcomed into Iraq as volunteers and during the invasion engaged in the fight outside 
Baghdad with coalition forces.
207
  This proved a major problem for American forces.   
The mass Iraqi populace was relatively limited in their resistance to the US 
occupation during the summer of 2003, and the main belligerents against coalition 
forces were former Saddam Baathists and foreign fighters.
208
  Therefore, because of the 
problem these fighters created (i.e., violence, instability, and the challenged US 
legitimacy in Iraq); the United States developed a strategy in defeating them.  The main 
goal for the coalition forces was, “to demonstrate that these fighters have no hope of 
evicting American troops from Iraq and to prevent Iraq from becoming a magnet for 
Islamic militants”.
209
  The coalition’s plan to achieve this goal was to track down the 
fighters and kill them.  An example of American success early on was in 2003 at the 
Rawa camp; Iraqis and foreign fighters used this camp to train for attacks on 
Americans, but after a clash with US forces, the camp was destroyed by American 
troops.
210
  This was very similar to the COIN strategy in Vietnam, which was to find the 
enemy and kill them.  An enemy-centric approach can show signs of success, as this 
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did; however, an enemy-centric approach cannot stand alone and for a long-term COIN 
and needs engagement of the local populace.   
The United States and coalition forces achieved limited short-term success 
against foreign fighters by destroying the size of their operational force.  However, 
coalition forces were still unable to prevent large-scale waves of fighters crossing the 
Iraqi border and wreaking mayhem on the US occupation because of their inability to 
lock the Iraqi border down.  When conducting a successful counterinsurgency 
operation, a winning strategy incorporates a secured border to prevent a safe haven for 
insurgents and avoid the potential flow of insurgents to and from the host nation.  The 
United States in the early months and year of the conflict were unable to lock down the 
Iraqi border and therefore had to contend with a much larger and widespread conflict.  
Because of these failures under Sanchez’s leadership, and the fact that Sanchez did not 
possess a fourth star which would have given him the ability to effectively work with 
CENTCOM and the US ambassador, Army General George Casey replaced General 
Sanchez after the transition of power in Iraq from the CPA to the Iraqi government.  
This replacement led to a change in policy, actions, and results for the American and 
coalition forces, the Iraqi government, and finally the Iraqi populace. 
In addition to these poorly executed tactics, the Americans mishandled the Iraqi 
people dealing specifically with the insurgency.  LT Col. Galula described the 
population as the prize in the conflict in his text, and said that “The population, 
therefore, becomes the objective for the counterinsurgent as it was for his enemy”.
211
  
Moreover, Thomas Ricks described the Americans’ view of the populace as the 
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“playing field” instead of the prize, which they are competing to win over against the 
insurgents.
212
   
In the early months into the conflict, the treatment of Iraqi civilians negatively 
hurt American efforts in the reconstruction phase.  A clear example of this comes from 
the detainment of Iraqi civilians.  Within the first 18 months of the operation, 30,000-
40,000 Iraqis passed through US detention facilities, many of which were taken during 
the middle of the night with no notification to the families for weeks.
213
  This eventually 
led to an understaffed and undertrained army reserve unit at Abu Ghraib that committed 
widespread prisoner abuse.  Many of the Iraqis arrested had limited or no direct 
connection to the insurgency efforts in Iraq, and after the treatment of the Iraqi civilians 
was discovered, this turned many Iraqi civilians and those in the global community 
further against the American efforts in Iraq.  
The Americans continued to violate basic counterinsurgency tactics to achieve 
short-term intelligence gains and victories.  The leadership failed to examine the effects 
of their policies towards the big picture and long-term strategy to win over Iraq and the 
Iraqi people and therefore diminished any chance of success within the first year of the 
conflict.  The chief of military history at West Point, Colonel Matthew Moten, stated, 
“Scholars are virtually unanimous in their judgment that conventional forces often lose 
to unconventional forces because conventional forces lack a conceptual understanding 
of the war they are fighting”.
214
  This is the clearest analysis of what went wrong in the 
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early years for the American military in Iraq; the military and the Bush Administration 
did not understand the conflict they were fighting.  
The actions and tactics taken by the leadership within the US military in 2003/4 
directly contradicted sound counterinsurgency policy and therefore made it made it 
difficult to win the Iraqi people over and put an end to the insurgency.  It raises the 
question of why the American leadership within the military seemed to ignore basic 
counterinsurgency tactics and try to “reinvent” the COIN wheel especially after a long 
history of counterinsurgency operations.  These operations ranged from the conflicts 
with the Indian tribes across the US, the Philippines in the 20
th
 century, Central America 
in the 1960s-80s, and the Vietnam War.  Fishel attempts to answer that question in his 
article “Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, The GAP, and Things That Go Bump in 
the Night”.   
Fishel outlined that there are three major reasons why the United States has to 
relearn counterinsurgency every time a COIN conflict arises.  The first reason outlined 
is the tradition of the American military.  Although the American militia experienced 
success against the British regulars in the early part of the American Revolution, 
Washington professionalized the Continental Army and it set a precedence that engaged 
each generation of officer corps every 30 years in large “professional” conflicts.
215
  
Secondly, the education at America’s military academy, West Point, adopted a 
technological orientation with its officer corps, which remains in their ethos today.
216
  
Finally, the romantic tradition and perception of 19
th
 century war based on the chivalric 
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European tradition of uniforms, marching in formation, and engaging your enemy head 
on in battle.
217
  This style was the opposite of the type of conflict that dominated the 
19
th
 century American military, specifically against the Indian tribes, which many 
considered messy.  The conflicts against the Indian tribes were often against non-
combatants, rarely engaged in open conflict, and nearly always by ambush; therefore, 
Fishel outlined how many in the US military preferred to prepare for a war against a 
“civilized force”.
218
  This view of COIN operations as just a nuisance and a distraction 
from the US military’s true role set the US behind in every major COIN operation as 
they relearn the lessons from the previous operation.          
Because of this view on COIN operations, the Americans experienced several 
setbacks and the US government suffered backlash and harsh criticism of their efforts to 
rebuild Iraq and their counterinsurgency operation at home.  By the end of 2003, the 
Americans did not just lose support at home in the United States, but the American 
occupation also began to lose Iraqi support and confidence.  A poll conducted for the 
CPA surveyed five different Iraqi cities in November and December 2003.  This poll 
revealed the negative sentiments held by the Iraqi people towards the American military 
force in Iraq.  With the growing violence and looting discussed earlier, 62% of the 
Iraqis surveyed believed that the most pressing issue was the topic of security and the 
growing threat and presences of violence in Iraq.
219
  Once violence became more 
widespread in 2003 and the Americans lost support from the Iraqi people and the world, 
a change in the upper leadership positions needed to occur.    
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Change in Leadership 
In 2004, Iraq experienced several changes at the leadership level.  After much 
consideration regarding who the proper choice was to replace General Sanchez, the 
White House chose General George Casey.  General Casey was a career infantryman 
and commander of the 1
st
 Armored who served in the peacekeeping mission in the mid 
to late 1990s in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Casey was tasked to lead a war against 
multiple insurgent factions within Iraq while attempting to rebuild Iraq’s government 
and society.  In addition to the change for the top military brass in Iraq, the US also 
replaced the top civilian official.  After the turnover of governmental duties to the 
Interim Iraqi Government (IIG), John Negroponte was appointed the ambassador to 
Iraq.  John Negroponte replaced Paul Bremer as the highest-ranking US civilian.  Casey 
and Negroponte attempted to work together to achieve success in Iraq and alter Iraq’s 
current path of a violent insurgency and increasingly dangerous sectarian tensions.          
First, the relationships between the Bush Administration, the different agencies, 
and US military were favorable compared to the relationships prior.  This was not a 
result of a policy change but the replacement of key officials.  These changes included 
Gen. Casey for Sanchez and Paul Bremer’s replacement in mid-2004 with John 
Negroponte.  John Negroponte was a career diplomat who was previously the US 
Ambassador to the United Nations.  After Bremer’s replacement, Ricks stated that the 
changes in both Washington and Baghdad were felt immediately.  Richard Armitage 




changed…We had reporting; it was orderly, things started to run”.
220
  The change in the 
US top leadership in Iraq on the civilian level ushered in a much stronger working 
relationship between the civilian and the military side of the operation.   
Too often, there was a communication problem between the civilian and the 
military side of the conflict; therefore, after the change in leadership, Casey and 
Negroponte established the “Red Cell” to create a shared vision.  The Red Cell was 
compiled of embassy officials, military officers, and intelligence experts, including 
British officers and diplomats with the purpose to generate a big picture report that 
would show the US the nature of the enemy and the nature of the war the US fought.
221
   
The plan first rejected the notion that the main challenge came from the Shiite 
militias, specifically the Mahdi Army.  Gordon and Trainor outlined the Red Cell’s 
rationale behind this finding because the Shiites could consolidate control during the 
upcoming election and therefore had no interest in stopping these elections.
222
  The Red 
Cell had little interest in disrupting the potential future relationship with the Shiite 
government and the US.  Therefore, the plan determined that the Sunni insurgent groups 
posed the biggest threat to the US and the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) efforts to 
rebuild Iraq.   
The Red Cell assessment group saw other difficulties that Iraq could face going 
forward if their primary goals were not achieved.  These goals included the assurance 
that the January elections occurred, the support of national reconciliation between the 
Sunni and Shi’a populations, the end to external support for the insurgent factions, the 
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buildup of Iraqi security forces, and assistance with the Iraqi government providing 
employment and services back to the Iraqi populace.
223
  The split between the military 
and civilian component characterized by Bremer and Sanchez’s leadership had 
narrowed, and now there was a more unified message and mission between the civilian 
and military operation.  While the relationship improved, there was still room for 
significant improvement between the civilians’ and military’s relationship.    
When Zalmay Khalilzad replaced Negroponte as ambassador, internal reviews 
by the government showed poor interagency cooperation and a heavy reliance on 
private contractors (which were slow and costly).  Khalilzad and Casey had a better 
relationship than Casey and Negroponte and attempted to solve the problems regarding 
interagency cooperation. 
Like Negroponte, Khalilzad recognized the tactical imbalance between the 
civilian and military assets within the country.  The civilian agencies were concentrated 
in the Green Zone and had limited insight into Iraqi society, Bowen outlined, while the 
military on the brigade level went into Iraqi neighborhoods daily and understood Iraqi 
society but was unaware of the political process unfolding in Baghdad.
224
  Similar to the 
problem in 2003, poor interagency sharing of information and expertise was the 
challenge in 2004/5 with Negroponte and Khalilzad.  Both ambassadors along with 
Gen. Casey took steps to pair the civilians’ and military’s knowledge together to create 
the best policy going forward.   
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The goal for better integration began during Casey’s and Negroponte’s time in 
charge.  Military representatives were encouraged to attend meetings by the embassy 
country team and the Joint Steering Committee; additionally, Casey established an 
interagency Strategic Operation Center, which regularly briefed senior military and 
civilian staff.
225
  During Khalilzad’s time as ambassador, Khalilzad and Casey further 
expanded the integration of the civilian and military component of the operation that 
Casey and Negroponte began.  For example, Bowen points out that “Key civilian and 
military staff met weekly in core groups on reconstruction, economic policy, political 
issues, and public communications, each of which became part of an integrated line of 
operation and reporting in support of goals established in the campaign plan”.
226
  In 
addition to the integration of the military and civilian wing and the layout of clear 
political goals, the US issued a nationwide counterinsurgency plan going forward in 
Iraq. 
Finally, the relationship between General Casey and General Abizaid, a Four 
Star General at CENTCOM, was an improvement from the previous leadership 
structure between Sanchez and Franks/Abizaid and the command structure with 
Bremer/Rumsfeld/Bush.  Casey and Abizaid had “little conflict and worked well 
together”, referring to both their knowledge in COIN theory, Abizaid’s regional 
expertise, and the fact that Abizaid trusted and supported Casey’s interpretation of how 
events in Iraq unfolded.
227 
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The second reason Casey was able to achieve some success was the changes 
made in the counterinsurgency policy.  The lack of a proper counterinsurgency policy 
ended with the replacement of General Sanchez with Army General George Casey in 
mid-2004.  This replacement ushered in a shift in counterinsurgency policy and attitude 
towards the conflict.  The US implemented a national counterinsurgency plan compared 
to General Sanchez where each division had relative autonomy to work within their 
region in Iraq.  This allowed some divisions to succeed like the 1
st
 Marine Division and 
the 101
st
 Airborne, while others dramatically failed in their reconstruction and COIN 
operations like the 4
th
 ID.   
A more unified strategy gave the US military a clear objective and a plan to 
stabilize Iraq and quell the insurgency.  One senior military intelligence officer recalled, 
“We did not have a campaign plan the whole time Sanchez was out there.  Until 
Casey’s arrival, there had been only a kill or capture mission and an endlessly debated 
draft of a campaign plan”.
228
  Gen. Casey’s plan called on the containment of insurgent 
violence, the buildup of Iraqi security forces, to rebuild Iraq economically, and to reach 
out and persuade the Sunni community to join the American side.
229
   
This change in strategy also coincided with an attempt to train the lower officers 
in the military in proper COIN tactics.  Gen. Casey added in a five-day-long school for 
all combat officers dubbed the COIN Academy.  The purpose of this class was to teach 
combat commanders the tools and skills needed to run an effective counterinsurgency 
campaign, and many officers praised the importance and success regarding their 
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attendance at this course.
230
  This course included “subjects from counterinsurgency 
theory and interrogations to detainee operations and how to dine with a sheik”; 
compared to prior practices when “commanders permitted troops to shoot at anything 
mildly threatening….and failed to give their troops the basic conceptual and cultural 
tools needed to operate in the complex environment of Iraq”.
231  This plan in 
conjunction with the recently held elections in Iraq were the guide to defeating the 
insurgency and rebuilding Iraq successfully.  These steps put forth by the new 
leadership looked much more reminiscent of what David Galula described in his book, 
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice.  
While there was finally a more unified mission between the civilian and the 
military component of the operation during General Casey’s leadership, any sense of 
national unity and identity failed to foster, which failed to reconcile the relationship 
between the Sunnis and Shiites.  There were some positive signs within Iraqi 
governmental institutions in 2005/2006, such as a serious effort to train, arm, and advise 
the Iraqi military along with some governmental efforts experiencing some success.  
However, most of the political success achieved was superficial by 2006 and most of 
2007 because the newly created government suffered from extreme polarization 
between the Sunni and Shi’a political parties.  The reconciliation success experienced in 
Iraq with the Sunnis and Shiites began to take root in the end of 2007 until 2011 when 
the US withdrew from Iraq.   
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However, in 2006 the Sunni Islamist organization, AQI, attacked a Shiite 
mosque in Samarra, Iraq, in which the direction of the conflict turned away from a 
classic insurgency into a sectarian civil war layered within the insurgency.  These 
fighters conducted suicide bombings on an unprecedented scale; these attacks inflicted 
mass devastation on the Iraqi population, specifically the Shiite Arabs.
232
  The 
Americans had no real solutions for the suicide bombings or other attacks, which caused 
more anger and frustration by the Iraqis towards the US and other coalition forces.  
American forces were unable to combat this retaliatory conflict between the Sunnis and 
Shiites, and Iraq fell deeper into conflict.       
The increase in violence during Gen. Casey’s leadership can be attributed to the 
rise of sectarian violence across Iraq.  The US lacked any real initiatives to deal with the 
rise of sectarian violence motivated against the Iraqi populace and continued to view the 
conflict in the scope of a basic insurgency.  For the next two years, US forces and 
governmental agencies failed to engage the Sunni population and help reconcile the 
differences between the Sunnis and Shi’a.  Therefore, Iraq saw a rise in sectarian 
violence between the Sunnis and the Shi'a and the United States’ efforts to stabilize the 
country were largely unsuccessful.  The Americans were unable to protect the civilian 
population against the different insurgent groups, specifically AQI and Shiite militia 
groups, and failed to gain the trust and support of the Iraqi people.  That was until 2007 
when General Petraeus took over Gen. Casey’s command.  The change in command 
ushered in a new military policy, referred to as the “The Surge”.  This change stabilized 
Iraq and engaged the Sunni population, which gave success to coalition forces.  
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The Stabilization of Iraq 
In the years leading up to “The Surge”, Iraq saw violence across the country 
increase specifically in motivated sectarian attacks; this resulted in massive civilians 
deaths (roughly 1,500 per month by August 2006), and the US military suffered 
casualties at an alarming rate of 100 KIA and 700 WIA per month.
233
  The war slipped 
away from the US, and the American populace grew tired of the conflict.  An estimated 
62% of Americans disapproved of the direction the war was taking and the overall 
conflict in July 2007.
234
  Therefore, in 2007, another change in leadership and 
examination at the direction of the conflict occurred.  The US would have to determine 
whether the time, money, and lives spent in Iraq would be worth it for the United States.  
This time General David Petraeus replaced General Casey.  The result of this change 
had an overwhelmingly positive effect.  The violence decreased and the number of US 
causalities decreased, which showed evidence of stability returning to Iraq. 
Sectarian Violence 
During the conflict, it became apparent that the war in Iraq had a detrimental effect on 
sectarian relations in the Middle East and that Iraq was pushed towards a sectarian civil 
war.
235
  Many believed that the start of the violence between the sectarian factions and 
militias began at the Samara shrine bombing in 2006.  However, the threat of violence 
had been brewing long before the 2006 bombing, and the reality was that the violence 
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was just a result of tensions between the two sides and the policies enacted by the US 
that pitted the Shi’a and the Sunnis against each other. 
After the invasion, many Iraqi neighborhoods became segregated or “purified” 
of minority sects, and these neighborhoods became primarily dominated by a single sect 
or ethnic group.
236
  The segregation is more evident than just in the divide of different 
communities.  Others included a segregated media; each outlet targeted a different sect, 
and the result was that Iraqis stopped watching the same news, ceased to follow the 
same issues, and even went as far as to stop watching the same TV shows.
237
  These 
conditions helped to shape the political consciousness of Iraq; the populace became 
increasingly isolated, and there was no public and peaceful forum or interaction 
between the Sunnis and Shiites.
238
  This was just the beginning of the problem and 
established the relationship early on in the invasion as to how relations between these 
groups would progress.  
The United States, during the reconstruction phase, alienated the Sunnis because 
they believed Sunni Arabs were pro-Saddam and pro-Baathist.  The deBaathification 
process destroyed Iraq’s managerial and professional class because of fears of loyalty to 
Saddam.  This idea was the same justification given for the disbanding of the military 
and police force.  These policies prevented Saddam loyalists from running the new Iraqi 
government; however, it alienated the Sunnis left in Iraq.  This pushed the Sunnis from 
once governing Iraq to a large outsider who had little say in the country’s new future.  
Regardless of who was previously in charge, if an outsider strips a political ideology 
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and party from power and demotes and alienates that population, there will be a 
backlash and even potential violence.  These policies resulted in the loss of credibility 
and legitimacy in the new Iraq for the Americans while disenfranchising a large 
percentage of the population while they propped up the other portion.   
Many Iraqis took advantage of this opportunity to target opponents.  Former 
American ally and unpopular former exile, Ahmad Chalabi, used this chance to target 
Sunnis and because of the influence that Chalabi and the other exiles had, the state 
became de-Sunnified.
239
  The Americans selected the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) 
based on sectarian and ethnic divides of all of Iraq, and the Sunni representation chosen 
was feeble and ineffective.  Even though the IGC had little support and was considered 
weak, the IGC wrote Iraq’s interim Constitution, which further exacerbated the Sunni 
and Shi’a divide.
240
  A secular Shiite named Ayad Allawi headed the interim 
government that replaced Bremer and the CPA in 2004.  
 The 2005 election that followed was based on a proportional representation of 
the different sects or ethnicities with Iraq as one district, as opposed dividing Iraq into 
different districts and regions.  This shifted the identity away from being an Iraqi or 
what locality the individual is from but instead Iraqis based their identification on their 
religious sects.  Rosen outlines how this process weakened local parties that had 
grassroots support and resulted in the strengthening of the ethnic and sectarian blocs 
across Iraq.
241
  This resulted in the boycott of the 2005 Iraqi elections by many Sunnis, 
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therefore strengthening the Shiite parties, which further alienated the Sunni population 
in the new Iraq.  
In this new Iraq, there was fear that some Shiites would seek revenge on the 
Sunni population; this became further ingrained when the Sunnis saw the Shiite 
dominated security forces and militias target the Sunni population.  Eventually, the 
Sunnis began to attack Shiite communities and structures.  At first Shiite leadership 
showed restraint under Allawi, but after the 2005 elections, the Islamic Supreme 
Council of Iraq took over the Interior Ministry and filled senior level positions with men 
from the Badr Militia, a Shiite-led militia.
242
  The Sunni Arabs became the primary 
victim of sectarian violence and the world began to see the replication of mass killings, 
torture, and executions.  Finally, because of the clear division between the Sunnis and 
Shiites, the Sunnis decided to take up arms against the Shiite government and the 
American occupation.  The main goal of the Sunni insurgency was to get the Americans 
out of Iraq so they could restore Iraq to the Sunni-dominated state it once was.  
Both sides feared each other, and violence eventually erupted after decades of 
old scores to settle.  The outbreak of violence was bound to happen because of historical 
trends when a tense relationship and dynamic existed between the old ruling class and 
now the new ruling class before the exchange of power.  However, based on the United 
States’ past counterinsurgency operation successes, if the United States had managed 
the relationship with more control and engaged the Sunnis as equal partners from the 
start, the damage would have been much more limited in scope.  However, it would 
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have been unknown how much control the Americans could have over the militias at the 
time.   
The conflict changed from a classic sense of an insurgency into a full-blown 
sectarian civil war.  American forces were unable in the early years of the conflict to 
manage the relationships between the Sunnis and the Shi’a effectively, and eventually, 
violence between the sides erupted.  These organizations attacked American forces, but 
after the bombing of the Samarra Mosque in 2006, began to attack their opposing 
sectarian population as well.  Because of the actions taken by the US government and 
the treatment of the Sunni population, sectarian violence haunted the American military 
effort until 2007, when the US implemented a change in COIN tactics and leadership. 
Shift in Counterinsurgency Policy: The Surge  
In early 2007, the security of the capital, Baghdad, deteriorated and it was clear that Iraq 
was in the middle of a civil war, between different warring sectarian factions who 
competed for power not only in Baghdad but also in all of Iraq.  The decision for the US 
was either to cut their losses and withdraw from Iraq, which essentially would have 
escalated the conflict and destabilized Iraq and the region further, or double down, 
which would increase troop levels along with a different engagement of the population.  
When the decision was made, President Bush met with Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuri al-
Malaki, in Amman, Jordan to inform him that there was going to be a dramatic change 
in US policy in order to achieve the objective, a stable and democratic Iraq.
243
 
The new strategy dubbed “The Surge” shifted US COIN policy away from 
Casey’s and Abizaid population-centric approach to a population centric approach that 
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made it a priority for the US military to protect the Iraqi population and help mend the 
relationship between the Sunnis and Shiites, which was a change during Petraeus’ 
command.  This required a more integrated role between the US military, the Iraqi 
population, and the Iraqi security forces.  This required a more noticeable footprint; 
therefore, in order to achieve that, the US needed to leave the forward operating bases 
(FOB) and increase their troop levels by 20-30k. 
This strategy was a bold and risky policy that President Bush believed would 
alter the direction of the conflict that would end the increasing violence in Iraq.  This 
approach was not widely supported by many within the US government.  President 
Bush made this change in policy on the recommendation of several groups, the first 
being The Iraq Study Group (ISG).  The ISG was an independent and bipartisan panel 
appointed in 2006 by the US Congress, and their purpose was to assess the situation in 
Iraq and create policy recommendations for President Bush to implement.  Former 
Secretary of State James Baker and Representative Lee Hamilton headed this panel. 
On December 6, 2006, the ISG outlined possible ways going forward and 
discussed possible alternatives to what they proposed and why they believed those 
options would result in failure.  Of these potentially ineffective policies discussed, one 
was an increase in US troop levels.  The ISG believed that a “Sustained increase in U.S. 
troop levels would not solve the fundamental cause of violence in Iraq, which is the 
absence of national reconciliation”.
244
  Their rationale was that once violence subsided 
and the troops were withdrawn from the area, violence would just commence again, 
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which is what occurred after the troop withdrawal in 2011.  Therefore, the idea of a 
surge in forces, alone, would unlikely be the best way forward, according to the ISG.     
Former Secretary of Defense to President Clinton, William Perry, believed that 
there should have been a date for American withdrawal, as this would give the 
Americans a timetable that would allow them to reevaluate if the situation in Iraq did 
improve.  This was not a universal belief within the ISG; Baker, for example, believed 
that posting a date for an American withdrawal would undermine the effectiveness of 
American and Iraqi forces.
245
  Baker decided that there was far too great of a risk to 
include a withdrawal date, and therefore decided it was best to exempt that clause from 
their final report.  Additionally, the ISG described US forces as stretched thin and 
consequently unable to address the growing concerns in Afghanistan or anywhere else 
throughout the world.
246
  Finally, the last recommendation of the ISG was to call for a 
more aggressive and robust diplomatic effort within the region.  Specifically, what the 
panel meant by this was the initiation of more talks between the Syrians and the 
Iranians, to prevent a sale of arms to the insurgent groups.
247
   
Both the Iranians and the Syrians acted as proxies to the different Sunni and 
Shiite insurgent groups in an attempt to gain more control in their bordering country.  
As a result, the United States threatened both with regime change; however, given the 
circumstances in Iraq at the time and the role in Afghanistan as well, regime change 
would have been unwise and unrealistic at the time to suggest.  This is based on the 
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political climate at home and the potential for spreading the US financially and 
militarily too thin.  Instead, if common ground could not have been achieved, which 
was unlikely, the US would have to find a way to prevent the influx of foreign fighters, 
arms, and other supplies into Iraq.        
The ISG’s suggested goal was to shift away from a strong American presence in 
Iraq and shift towards a policy that allowed the Iraqis to take control of the major 
security and political responsibilities of the nation.
248
  The ISG argued that there needed 
to be a shift away from combat operations and the beginning of a more advisory role 
until the drawdown began and the Iraqis would take over.  However, not everyone 
within the ISG was adamant regarding a US drawdown.  For example, Senator Chuck 
Robb, a Democrat, believed that the United States had a moral obligation to stay in Iraq 
until order could be restored because the United States had invaded, adopting the 
similar principle that Colin Powell had regarding his “Pottery Barn Policy”.
249
  Chuck 
Robb believed that the US had far too much “skin” in the game to just walk away and 
leave the job incomplete; therefore, he suggested that the US adopt the policy of 
increasing troop level and called it “a surge”.
250
  While some within the ISG did not 
believe in adopting a policy that increased US troop levels, Robb made it a condition of 
his signing off on the policy, and the ISG eventually decided to adopt this plan in the 
effort to stabilize Baghdad.  
The ISG was not the only group tasked with offering a solution to the Iraq 
question.  In addition to the ISG, the first came from the Chairman of the Joint Chief of 
                                                 
248
 United States Institute of Peace, Iraq Study Group, The Iraq Study Group report, by James Addison 
Baker, Lee Hamilton, and Lawrence S. Eagleburger, 6. 
249






Staff (CJCS) 2006 Study Group regarding Iraq is commonly referred to the “Council of 
Colonels” and the second came from the outside consultant American Enterprise 
Institute (AEI) that examined the question for a way forward in Iraq.  General Peter 
Pace established the Council of Colonels.  The CJCS Council of Colonels comprised of 
“just over a dozen officers selected because of their Iraq combat experience or their 
reputations as strategic thinkers” and their goal was to challenge top officials and other 
consultants regarding how to solve the Iraq problem.
251
   
The Council of Colonels gave three potential options for future US policy, such 
as the “Go Big” plan, which was championed by H.R. McMaster that essentially argued 
for sending all available forces to Iraq and extending the tour length of those already 
there.  There was a “Go Long” plan designed to reduce the American presence and 
reduce casualties, therefore making the conflict more acceptable for the home 
population.  Finally, there was the “Go Home” strategy, which outlined a plan to 
withdraw all US troops from Iraq.  Although the Council of Colonels offered some 
options for policy, the most significant contribution the Council of Colonels made was 
that they defined the problems and the conflict that the Americans faced.   
For example, the Council of Colonels identified the specific trends in the war.  
These specific trends were all negative, but these findings included points like how the 
current strategy did not work, how the current Iraqi security force was weak, the 
increased cycle of sectarian violence, and still a slow Iraqi economy.
252
  The colonels 
believed the US “needed to acknowledge that it was involved in a complex insurgency 
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as well as an escalating civil war”.
253
  The proper characterization of the conflict was 
critical to know how to proceed and help the US escape a short war mentality and 
develop a longer-term strategy in the fight for Iraq.   
The final consultant that tackled the Iraq question was the American Enterprise 
Institute (AEI).  AEI’s report was headed by Fredrick Kagan and had additional support 
from General Jack Keane (Retired).  Their report recommended not an immediate 
withdrawal of Iraq, which many people throughout the United States government called 
for.  The AEI committee believed that an immediate removal would result in an 
“immediate defeat for the United States.  The Iraqi Security Forces are entirely 
dependent upon American support to survive and function.  If U.S. forces withdraw 
now, Iraqi troops will collapse”.
254
  This would mark a US defeat in Iraq, and the 
turbulence from Iraq would threaten Iraq’s surrounding neighbors.        
In their policy proposal titled Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq, they 
outlined their policy options that the Bush Administration should take to achieve victory 
in Iraq.  This option would rival and agree to some degree with the ISG proposal and 
the CJCS Council of Colonel's recommendations.  The highlights of this report included 
an increase in US military personnel with seven Army Brigades and Marine Regiments 
to support the operation around Baghdad.
255
  In addition, American and Iraqi forces 
would clear and secure Sunni majority neighborhoods in addition to Shi’a and Sunni 
mixed neighborhoods, and provide after-combat but permanent security and 
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  They believed that these options allowed Iraq and the Iraqi population 
to stabilize and in doing so Iraq’s central government could appear as if they had 
control and their country was not in turmoil.   
The current strategy transferred too much power away from the Americans and 
any shift towards an Iraqi-led security was destined to fail.  Therefore, with the support 
of President Bush’s NSC staff, headed by Steve Hadley, the administration was able to 
compile a new plan going forward and combine elements from all three major plans, the 
AEI plan, the ISG Group, and the CJCS Council of Colonels.  Hadley took the “the 
surge” strategy mainly from Kagan and Keane’s work with AEI and combined it with 
elements from the ISG Group and the Council of Colonels.  President Bush decided to 
go against the policy recommendations of many within the US government and military 
who believed that the American presence was the problem in Iraq.
257
  Therefore, on 
January 10, 2007, President Bush ordered a change in the US counterinsurgency policy 
and adopted the policy known as “The Surge”, which also brought in a change to a 
more population-centered approach to counterinsurgency.  This strategy involved an 
increase of American personnel by roughly 20-30,000 troops in the effort to stabilize 
the country, specifically in Baghdad and Anbar Province, with the goal to decrease the 
violence against American and Iraqi personnel and help Iraq gain a sense of long-term 
stability.    
As the discussion as to how to proceed in Iraq occurred in the United States, the 
Iraqis in Anbar Province banded together and formed an alliance called the “Anbar 
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Awakening”.  This alliance occurred because of the encouragement from the US and 
displeasure towards AQI by the local Sunnis, because of their violence and brutality, 
which ultimately helped engage the Sunni populace and turned them towards the side of 
the Americans.  Because of the relationships during the Anbar Awakening between the 
different tribes fostered, it allowed Sunni Iraqi militias to form with the backing of the 
US.  Eventually, these militias would become known as the Sons of Iraq (SOI).      
The Sons of Iraq were the result of a cultivated relationship between the 
battalion commanders of cities and tribal sheiks, imams, and other key locals that the 
US took advantage of during “The Surge”.  Many were fearful, Americans and Iraqis, 
that this was a gun-for-hire program, and an organization like SOI could organize the 
next stage of the civil war and never give up the armed struggle against a Shi’a 
government.  Many Shi’a Iraqis feared that bringing a large number of armed Sunnis 
back into the government could ignite the return of the repressive Sunni-led 
government.  Americans, like Andrew Bacevich, compared the American support of 
SOI to “arming the Crips to fight the Bloods”, and that “if the US military empowered a 
rogue militia, like SOI, they would eventually attack the government”.
258
  Bacevich was 
incorrect in his prediction regarding the American engagement of local militias like 
SOI, and as the Americans showed along with past countries’ COIN operations, local 
militias are crucial in the achievement of stability and a decrease in violence.   
With the new relationship that unfolded because of the Anbar Awakening, 
between the Americans and the Sunni tribes, and a new COIN strategy the US agreed 
upon, a change in leadership was needed.  In January 2007, General David Petraeus 
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received a call by the new Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, and during the call, 
Petraeus was offered, and he accepted the job of the new Multinational Force 
Commander (MNF) in Iraq and a promotion to a Four-Star General.
259
  After the Senate 
confirmed Petraeus, he was tasked with implementing President Bush’s new policy.   
Equally crucial to the replacement of the MNF commander with Petraeus, the 
replacement of the Multinational Corps (MNC) Commander General Peter Chiarelli 
with General Ray Odierno and the replacement of Khalilzad as Ambassador to Iraq with 
Ryan Crocker were essential for the implementation of the new strategy.  General 
Odierno commanded the 4
th
 ID during the invasion of Iraq in Tikrit where he suffered a 
reputational defeat for not implementing a proper COIN strategy that was needed.  This 
failure damaged the US’ reputation and progress in Iraq along with Gen. Odierno.  
However, after his time with the 4
th
 ID, Odierno learned from his mistakes in Tikrit and 
looked to apply the lessons he learned during his time as a three-star in his new role as 
the commander of the MNC.  Ambassador Crocker served throughout the Middle East, 
like Lebanon, Syria, Kuwait, Afghanistan, and Iraq, and additionally he was the 
ambassador in Pakistan.  During Crocker’s career, he gained a vast wealth of 
knowledge of the region and the people in the Middle East and during Crocker’s 
retirement, President Bush referred to him as “America’s Lawrence of Arabia”.
260
  The 
Americans now had leaders with a vision and the knowledge needed that would move 
Iraq towards stability, making this endeavor a success. 
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This change in strategy did not just include an increase in American personnel 
into Iraq but also a shift in tactics.  This revised plan was crucial in the Council of 
Colonels’ findings and the AEI recommendations.  Prior to the surge, under Gen. 
Casey’s leadership, implemented some characteristics of a population-centric strategy, 
however, when Gen. Petraeus took over, the direction of the military changed again.  
Petraeus’ approach concentrated on protecting the population and focused on 
rebuilding, providing basic amenities, and securing the Iraqi populace, and included to 
help repair the divide between the Sunni and Shiite populations which was possible 
because of the Anbar Awakening prior to Petraeus’ arrival.
261
 
Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro outlined the new strategy as, “a replacement of 
prior emphasis on large, fortified bases, mounted patrols, towards a transition to Iraqi-
led security forces with a new pattern of smaller, dispersed bases, dismounted 
patrolling, and direct provision of U.S. security for threatened Iraqi civilians”.
262
  This 
increased the coalition’s presence, gave an Iraqi-led face on the counterinsurgency, and 
eventually reduced the level of violence in Iraq by ultimately suffocating the insurgency 
and destroying their ability to kill Americans or Iraqis on a large scale.
263
  
“The Surge” was more successful compared to previous COIN operations by the 
United States in Iraq because they adopted a working relationship with the local Sunni 
groups who once fought American soldiers, which was made possible because of the 
“Anbar Awakening”.  Petraeus urged for national reconciliation between the Sunnis and 
Shiites.  Petraeus stated, “You have to give the Sunnis a reason to support the new Iraq” 
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and therefore, he urged his officers to encourage tribal engagement and local 
reconciliation.
264
  Petraeus and others believed that the best way to defeat the Sunni 
insurgency was not to defeat them militarily but by “flipping those who could be 
flipped”.
265
  This policy was similar to a degree to what Jay Garner proposed in the 
early months of the occupation when deciding how to proceed with the Iraqi military 
and engage the Sunni Iraqis as equal partners, giving them a legitimate seat at the table 
in the new Iraq both politically and militarily.      
The US worked with tribal leaders before the time of “The Surge”, but 
ideologically; the American government was not ready.  In 2003, the American military 
had wanted to work with the Iraqi tribes, but were “hammered” for it, recalled one 
American strategist in Iraq.
266
  The strategist described his meeting with Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, who stated how disturbed and concerned he was 
at the fact of the tribal importance of Iraq.  The idea of working with the Sunni tribes 
was discussed during the transition after Casey and Negroponte took over.  Some 
believed at the time that the Sunnis were the principal danger and needed to be lured 
into the political system; however, like Bremer before, Casey and Negroponte rejected 
the notion.
267
  Petraeus and others disagreed with people like Bacevich, Casey, and 
Negroponte regarding the importance of mending relationships with the Sunni tribes. 
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The US viewed what would eventually become SOI as a valuable ally against al 
Qaeda.  These organizations provided intelligence and helped secure areas that had little 
to no police presence in Sunni-dominated territory, like Anbar.  Many Sunnis 
throughout Iraq positively responded to this chance of reconciliation with the United 
States.  The attempt at moderate reconciliation was successful up to this point for 
several key reasons. 
Before the “Awakening”, the Sunnis in Anbar fought the United States 
regarding the occupation, but the United States was eventually able to enlist the help of 
the Sunnis.  The US was able to persuade these Sunni tribes into a cease-fire for several 
reasons.  First, the Sunni tribes longed for stability within Iraq; these tribes saw the 
United States as an agent of stability compared to al Qaeda and other groups who were 
considered agents of chaos.
268
   
Secondly, the United States was able to provide security and protection to the 
tribes within the “Awakening” alliance.  For example, those tribes friendly to the United 
States received protection from the American military; therefore, tribes that were part of 
the “Awakening”, when attacked, would receive American air and armor support that 
resulted in the rescue of these tribes from groups like AQI
269
.  This built a trustful 
relationship, and Sunni tribes became friendlier to the Americans.  Next, the tribal 
leaders felt alienated by the brutality of AQI and the work by Zarqawi that included 
AQI’s rhetoric and their violent tactics towards the populace.  The Sunnis feared the 
Shi’a militias or death squads and the violence that had been unleashed for the past two 
                                                 
268
 Rosen, “Aftermath: Following the Bloodshed of America's Wars in the Muslim World”, 234. 
269




years on them from Shi’a insurgent groups, and they understood that once the 
Americans left, they could be at risk of violence if they did not protect themselves.
270
   
Finally, the guaranteed payment of $300 per fighter from either the US or Iraqi 
government was enough to sway these Sunnis to join groups like the Sons of Iraq and 
fight alongside the United States.
271
  This alliance between the US and the Sunni tribes 
resulted in one fewer insurgent organization that fought US forces and created a major 
regional alliance in the attempt to create a stable Iraq.  These groups abandoned their 
alliance with AQI and their fight against US troops; therefore, the United States freed 
precious resources by aligning with the SOI and tribes within the “Awakening” to fight 
AQI.  
This policy of allying with the reconcilables and killing those who would not 
work with American forces succeeded in destroying the Sunni-led insurgency.
272
  
However, many opponents of this policy still saw the Sons of Iraq as “guns for hire” 
and believed that the Sunni tribes would not permanently give up the fight against the 
new Iraqi government but instead would usher in a new phase of the current Sunni-
Shi’a civil war.
273
  To prevent conflict between the Sunnis and Shi’a from reigniting in 
the long-term, it had to be made clear to Maliki that he needed to incorporate the SOI 
into the Iraqi police and other security jobs.  This was important because the Iraqi 
population largely preferred to have local residents in charge of neighborhood security, 
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especially when the police force was still largely Shi’a.
274
  Robinson points out a recent 
survey completed in Iraq that showed 56% of Iraqis support the SOI compared to 49% 
who support the government; therefore, those who marginalize SOI misunderstand the 
importance that SOI had on the ceasefire and run the risk of the sectarian conflict 
reigniting.
275
           
This policy was ultimately successful for the Americans and led to the peace and 
stability in Iraq.  Petraeus explained, “these guys used to point their guns at us.  Now 
they are pointing their guns at AQI”.
276
  This plan worked and displayed how change 
occurred in Iraq.  It was slow; and the US spent lots of capital in time, effort, and 
treasure to succeed in bringing the Sunni Iraqis into the peace and reconstruction 
process in Iraq, but ultimately it was successful.  This showed that the Sunni populace 
was willing to work for the Shi’a government if they were brought in as an equal 
partner.  While the mistrust might be there for a generation, the distrust would begin to 
decrease the more substantial but equal role the Sunnis had in the government and 
security compared to the Shi’a.    
In addition to the reconciliation with the Sunni tribes across Iraq, the US 
military and the Iraqi government were able to crack down on the Shi’a militia groups, 
like the Mahdi Army.  This crackdown began in March 2008, when American and Iraqi 
security forces led an operation in Basra; the operation’s aim was to limit the power of 
the Mahdi Army and other Shi’a groups while strengthening government-backed 
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  This eventually led to a ceasefire between the Iraqi government and 
the Shi’a groups, which assisted in the decreased rate of violence.  Additionally, this 
showed the Sunni populace that Maliki was not just attacking Sunni insurgent groups 
but also seeking to end the armed violence from the Shi’a militias.     
Finally, this COIN operation was successful because there was better 
communication within the United States leadership but also between the United States 
and the Iraqi government.  Ambassador to Iraq from the United States Ryan Crocker 
was Petraeus’ civilian counterpart, and together they were tasked with rebuilding Iraq 
and taking over from where Gen. Casey and Zalmay Khalilzad left Iraq.  Petraeus and 
Crocker worked closely together to ensure that they followed the same cohesive 
message especially when they presented policy options to Maliki and the Iraqis.
278
   
This messaging was also crucial in the US military.  For example, there was 
clear disagreement and dissension in American leadership before 2007, specifically 
within the early years of the conflict.  The relationship between Paul Bremer and 
General Sanchez made it very clear that they did not like each other.  This made it tough 
to work together and accomplish the mission in Iraq.  However, in 2007, besides the 
strong relationship between Crocker and Petraeus, the relationship between Petraeus 
and General Ray Odierno is necessary to mention.  Kilcullen mentioned that before 
2007, “Everyone knew that Petraeus and Odierno did not get along”, that Odierno and 
Petraeus had been competitors and Petraeus had a better reputation coming out of 
Mosul than Odierno did coming out of Tikrit in 2004.  However, Kilcullen goes on to 
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mention that once they began to work together in 2007 there was almost “no discernible 
friction”.
279
  Their relationship operated very smoothly and resulted in positive steps 
forward for Iraq and the American operation. 
Even for Petraeus and Odierno's differences, their key similarities benefited 
Iraq’s rebuilding effort.  Colonel H.R. McMaster noted their flexibility as leaders was 
their most effective quality and allowed the operation to run smoothly.
280
  Therefore, 
because of the professionalism these men operated with over the next five years, 
violence decreased and Iraqi stability increased.  This is a result of the stronger 
relationship between the Iraqi government and the US military/government.   
During 2007, the military surveyed the mental health and the morale of US 
troops fighting in Iraq.  Despite the hard and tense fighting for the first half of 2007, the 
study showed a sharp rebound in morale and mental health generally by the US military 
compared to past years.
281
  This boost was credited to the effect of the “The Surge” as 
some American soldiers expressed.  One stated, “The surge hammered us at first but 
over the past couple of months it seems to be working….and if we were a football team, 
we are just now having a winning record”.
282
  The tide was turned both militarily and 
mentally.   
Not only did morale significantly improve for US troops during 2007, but also 
the deaths per month and the number of IED attacks dramatically declined.  At the start 
of 2007, the chances a civilian supply would be attacked was 1 in 5, and by December 
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2007, it was 1 in 33.
283
  These were abrupt changes of the conditions in Iraq.  Not only 
were the IED attacks becoming less frequent, but the IEDs also became less potent.  
This showed real change on the ground and resulted in fewer casualties.   
One case study showed a district located in Baghdad on average experienced a 
monthly rate of 35 IED attacks; however, from May to August 2007, that rate 
plummeted from 35 to two.
284
  One of the most dangerous blocks in Baghdad also saw a 
dramatic drop in Iraqi civilian monthly deaths from 26 to 0.6 by the end of 2007.
285
  
This was a sharp decrease, and now there was tangible evidence that the new 
counterinsurgency policy began to take shape and return Iraq to a sense of normalcy and 
stability.  These results within the city showed signs of success from the new plan; some 
of that strategy entailed a working relationship with Sunni locals and militias.  
Throughout 2007 combat deaths steadily declined, peaking in May with 126, and 
December ended in 14 KIAs.
286
  The Americans seemed to have finally stabilized the 
violence in Iraq, and this change in strategy and leadership was a major reason for it.             
For the next five years, it was clear that Iraq had come a long way since 2007.  
A successful COIN operation was achieved because of the relationship between the US 
and Sunni tribes, the relationship between the US and the Iraqi government, the increase 
of US troops by 20-30,000, and finally a change of COIN tactics that brought the US 
and Iraqi forces together to destroy the remaining insurgents and quell sectarian 
violence.  The stability achieved was accomplished through policy initiatives and the 
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engagement of the different sectarian segments of the population.  The stability shown 
and the relationship (at the time) between the government and the population illustrated 























Withdrawal from Iraq and the Way Forward 
January 2009 President Bush left office and gave the new president, President 
Obama, an Iraq much better off than it was in 2003-2007.  In 2009, the insurgency was 
broken, and AQI was defeated and struggled to survive.  American and Iraqi casualties 
dramatically decreased, sectarian violence all but dissipated, and sectarian 
reconciliation appeared to be moving in the right direction.  The operation in Iraq turned 
in the Americans’ favor and finally appeared like a successful operation.  However, the 
new president wanted to “clean his hands” of the “bad war”, which led to the premature 
withdrawal from Iraq in 2011.  This policy hurt the future and stabilization of not only 
Iraq but also the Middle East.  The eventual policy of withdrawal left Iraq in worse 
shape, increased violence throughout, and resulted in the loss of Iraqi territory to a new 
insurgent group called the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) because of President 
Obama’s Middle Eastern policies, which included the policy decision to withdraw from 
Iraq prematurely.    
Withdrawal from Iraq  
When then-Senator Obama was on the campaign trail during the 2008 election, he 
heavily campaigned on ending the war in Iraq.  He believed that “The War was a 
needless and costly war that tarnished America’s reputation” and that the United States 
should withdraw from Iraq.
287
  Obama won the presidency during the 2008 election and 
therefore, when Obama entered the 2012 campaign, it was a political imperative that he 
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fulfilled his campaign promise and he did.  Vice President Biden called the “victory” in 
Iraq “one of the great achievements of this administration”; however, it appeared that 
President Obama tried to shift his priorities away from Iraq to obtain a sense of 
deniability if Iraq would dissipate and crumble.
288
   
Vali Nasr, the former senior advisor to Ambassador Richard Holbrooke of 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, called Iraq, “A signature American project whose outcome 
will be the measure of our reliability and legacy of power in the Middle East”.
289
  Since 
the end of the Cold War, Iraq has been a cornerstone and a thorn in the United States’ 
foreign policy.  The United States first beat back regional ambitions of Iraq in regard to 
the invasion of Kuwait.  Next, the US constricted their power with the implementation 
of a no-fly zone and international sanctions, destroyed Saddam’s Iraq by removing him 
from power, and finally established a new Iraq.  The United States had their footprint in 
Iraq and was heavily invested in the outcome.     
Unfortunately, the Obama Administration did not hold Iraq with the same level 
of importance.  The US pledged to the Middle East that they would be better off with 
American intervention during the Bush Administration, but instead, the region was 
“dangerously close to a vortex of instability and sectarian conflict, and the region lost 
trust for American power” as a result of the Obama Administration.
290
  What the Obama 
Administration did regarding Iraq reinforced the belief that the United States did not 
have the perseverance to finish the job and left Iraq and the Middle East to their own 
fate.  Nasr outlined that a quick withdrawal in 2011 and not a renewed agreement with 
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Iraq would confirm the Middle East’s worst fears, and would only damage the US’s 
reputation more.     
In 2008, the Bush Administration negotiated a Status of Forces Agreement 
(SOFA) with the Maliki-led government in Iraq.  The agreement pledged that all US 
forces would depart from Iraq in 2011; however, some factors needed to be achieved 
before a US departure.  For example, for the US to depart according to SOFA, the Iraqi 
government had to hold together long enough and Iraqi security forces had to show they 
could keep the peace on the streets and enforce the rule of law.
291
  Even with this 
agreement in place, the 2011 departure date was more of a symbolic gesture because 
there was an understanding that a sizable American force would remain in Iraq 
following the 2011 SOFA deadline.
292
  
The Iraqi political system was still young and fragile and still required American 
supervision to ensure future elections were conducted freely and fairly.  However, the 
Obama Administration was tired and wanted to move on from Iraq.  Based on the Iraqi 
elections, Maliki should have been removed from the premiership.  Ayad Allawi would 
have replaced Maliki after his party; the Iraqiyya party defeated the al-Da’awa party 
24.7 to 24.2%.
293
  However, to maintain power, Maliki claimed Shi’a and former 
Baathist Allawi’s connection to the predominately Sunni Saudi Arabia and his 
leadership would, therefore, risk thrusting Iraq towards sectarian violence again.  Maliki 
was able to sway American officials to support him, and Maliki, in the end, was able to 
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keep his role as Prime Minister.
294
  The result of the election would have left the Prime 
Minister position to Allawi; however, knowing the actions taken by Maliki after his 
“reelection”, would the United States have been better off backing the popular vote 
winner of the election, Allawi, and instead form a new government that would result in 
a reinvestment in Iraq? 
The United States would have been better off backing a candidate like Allawi, 
who was a pro-western, secular Shiite, and had strong relations with the Sunni 
populace.
295
  The US could have legitimately built a functional coalition to move Iraq 
forward, but decided to place Maliki back in power even though many throughout Iraq 
feared that Maliki showed authoritarian tendencies as a leader.  A potential reason for 
this decision was that contesting Maliki’s legitimacy as a leader or assisting in building 
a new government would take time, energy, and investment from the Obama 
Administration when the Administration was looking to pivot away from Iraq.
296
  
Therefore, it would have been easier for the US to support Maliki remaining as PM.   
This support allowed Maliki to further his practice of authoritarianism, 
specifically against the Sunni population.  It made the US appear to be a dishonest 
broker for the Iraqis after the US claimed for seven years that they were there to help 
the Iraqi people and as a result, the US lost the trust of the Iraqi populace.  In addition, 
many within the US government wanted Maliki out because they noticed his attempts to 
consolidate power and persecute the Sunnis, which threatened to remove all of the 
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progress achieved by the Americans over the past eight years.
297
  Maliki grew 
suspicious of the US government and noticed the dissent by some against his rule that 
involved potentially removing Maliki from power as a result of the 2010 election and, 
therefore, became unwilling to compromise.  This set the table for the 2011 negotiations 
for a new SOFA.  
Negotiations began in June 2011 and there were two major hurdles the United 
States had to overcome if an American military presence would remain in Iraq.  The 
first hurdle the Obama Administration had to overcome before the SOFA expired in 
2011 was the continuation of immunity for the American military for crimes committed 
in Iraq.  The Iraqis wanted the ability to prosecute American troops for crimes 
committed in Iraq, but all members of the American military were under the jurisdiction 
of the Military Court and not the Iraqi court system.  If American personnel would 
remain in Iraq, the Iraqi government wanted to change that provision in the 2011 SOFA.   
In 2008, in the renegotiated SOFA, it stated that off-duty Americans could be 
prosecuted by the Iraqi court system for crimes they committed, but excluded on-duty 
troops.
298
  Since American troops were never considered off-duty by the American 
government, because American troops in a combat zone were always considered on-
duty, they avoided this demand in the 2008 SOFA.  Obama could have renegotiated a 
continuation of the agreement for post-2011 Iraq using the same model and path put 
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forward by the Bush Administration, but he argued for full immunity, which was not 
acceptable for Iraqis, as they believed it was a violation of their sovereignty.
299
  
The second hurdle the Obama Administration had to overcome was the residual 
troop level that would remain in Iraq.  Washington’s first offer for a residual force was 
10,000 troops along with continuation of immunity; PM Maliki agreed, but stated he 
needed time to line up political allies.
300
  In August 2011, the Pentagon, State 
Department, and White House agreed upon a new number for the residual troop force, 
and they decided that the number was only 3,000-5,000 American troops.
301
  However, 
when negotiations progressed, the Iraqis sensed Obama’s lack of continued dedication 
to Iraq, and these figures proved the perception of his lack of commitment to Iraq, 
especially because the Iraqi military headed by Gen. Babakir Zebari requested 
American troops not to withdraw until 2020.
302
  Therefore, because of the perceived 
lack of commitment and the Iraqis not having the ability to prosecute off-duty American 
soldiers for perceived crimes committed, the Iraqis rejected the Americans’ offer for a 
continuation of their SOFA agreement. 
The United States military worried Iraq would revert to open conflict again if 
American forces withdrew early.  However, the Obama Administration realized their 
frustrations with Iraq and saw the ability to low ball the residual force level and 
completely remove American involvement from Iraq.  The Administration knew the 
Iraqis would decline any SOFA with only 3,000-5,000 troops and a full immunity 
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clause, and therefore, Obama could use this as the excuse he needed to follow through 
on his campaign promise in what was predicted to be a tight political race for his 2012 
reelection campaign, and withdraw all American forces from Iraq.   
Alternatively, the low number could have been the administration ignoring the 
request of the military to keep a larger presence in Iraq, which would have acted as a 
deterrent to prevent any large-scale sectarian fighting or deter further foreign 
intervention by the Turkish, Syrians, or Iranians in Iraq.  Maliki and the Iraqi 
government rejected the offer of 3,000-5,000 American soldiers and the new immunity 
clause; therefore, all American forces were scheduled to leave by the end of 2011.  
Since the Americans did not offer an agreeable deal to the Iraqis, this confirmed the 
suspicions to the Iraqis regarding American commitment to Iraq and the region.   
Since American forces were withdrawing from Iraq, Vice President Joe Biden 
was given the task of overseeing the United States’ exit.  Joe Biden offered experience 
in the foreign affairs department to President Obama during his campaign.  Biden was 
the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and had decades of Senate 
experience.  During Biden’s time as the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, he wrote an op-ed article in 2006 for the NY Times along with Les Gelb, 
president of the Council on Foreign Relations, that discussed what the potential plan 
and goal should be for Iraq.         
His opinion reviewed the comparison between the situation in Bosnia and the 
conflict in Iraq as of 2006.  Biden discussed that the only way to unite Iraq was by 
decentralizing the power structure.  He wrote, “This plan gave each ethno-religious 




central government in charge of common interests”.
303
  Essentially, Biden and Gelb 
believed Iraq could become “a loose federation within secure borders”.
304
  That the 
ideal Iraq would be divided up into different ethnic or religious “states” with one central 
government to assist in important and common interests of the “states”.   
However, the Biden-Gelb plan was problematic.  The theory discussed by Biden 
and Gelb would dismantle and divide Iraq into three semiautonomous states.  Many 
feared this would lead to an eventual official partition of Iraq and that the Sunnis would 
get a state with no oil and consequently become dependent on the Shiite government to 
give them their fair share of oil profits, which inherently caused many Sunnis to oppose 
this plan.
305
  The ISG discussed this potential outcome during the 2006 analysis of the 
future of Iraq.  However, their recommendation regarding a semi-three-state solution 
was not viewed as realistic.   
Partly because Iraq’s population did not separate neatly, regional boundaries 
would be challenging to design.  The eighteen provinces in Iraq including their major 
cities are mixed, and it would be complicated to separate these cities peacefully.  
Therefore, the diversity of states and provinces in Iraq would have made it very arduous 
to divide into specific yet stable sectarian governance.  In addition, initiating a large-
scale relocation would cause chaos in Iraq, very similar to the Pakistan/India relocation 
in the late 1940s.  Any large-scale population movement could potentially lead to 
“collapse of the Iraqi security forces, strengthening of militias, ethnic cleansing, 
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destabilization of neighboring states, or attempts by neighboring states to dominate Iraqi 
regions”.
306
  Understanding the Biden and Gelb belief system could help explain why 
the Obama Administration acted the way that they did regarding Iraq. 
The Obama Administration hoped that with the withdrawal from Iraq, they 
could rid the US of the Iraqi question and essentially force the Iraqis to figure out their 
sectarian and political problems for themselves.  However, what occurred in reality was 
increased foreign involvement.  The Turks became more involved in the North, a 
stronger participation and relationship between Iran and Iraq flourished in the 
dominantly Shiite south, and finally, Maliki abandoned the democratic principles as 
Prime Minister and began to crack down on political opponents.
307
  Any sense of Iraqi 
unity and new identity began to fade, and sectarian division began to resurface.  
However, if the US remained in Iraq as a stabilizing presence even in a limited role, 
Iraq would have been able to continue down the same path set forth and slowly move 
towards the Iraq being built.            
 The Obama Administration understood that the risk of withdrawing from Iraq 
before the Iraqi government and police force were stable enough to deal with the 
insurgency in Iraq effectively was a real threat.  The military continually warned the 
Obama Administration about the threat from withdrawing early; however, there was a 
considerable amount of pressure to withdraw US troops from Iraq based on the previous 
policies discussed with the Maliki government and the American electorate.  However, 
as Dobbins points out, “if keeping U.S. troops in Iraq provoked further resistance, 
                                                 
306
 United States Institute of Peace., Iraq Study Group., The Iraq Study Group report, by James Addison 
Baker, Lee Hamilton, and Lawrence S. Eagleburger (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 
2006), 31. 
307




withdrawing them prematurely could provoke much worse: a civil war or a regional 
crisis of unpredictable dimensions”.
308
  However, the Obama Administration decided to 
give in to political pressure going into his reelection year and disregarded the reality of 
the situation in Iraq.  
In addition to lacking the political will to stay in Iraq, there are two other 
important factors to consider when discussing Iraq during the Obama Administration.  
The first factor to consider is the replacement of the Ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, 
with Christopher Hill.  Ambassador Hill was a poor choice for an ambassadorship in 
Iraq for two main reasons.  First, his experience and skill set were not suited for Iraq.  
Hill became Ambassador to Iraq, possessed no Middle Eastern experience and 
possessed zero understanding of Arabic or the Arab world.  With zero experience in the 
region, Hill should have relied on his staff that had experience in region and country, 
but he did not.  Emma Sky pointed out in her book The Unraveling that Hill 
marginalized his experienced staff and an example is Hill’s treatment of Robert Ford.  
Sky discussed how Hill repeatedly rejected advice from Ford, who was a well respected 
and a knowledgeable Arabist who completed three tours in Iraq and cut his tour as 
ambassador in Algeria short in order to return to Iraq and served as Hill’s deputy; 
however, Hill pressured Ford to depart Iraq early in 2010.
309
   
The second reason was Hill’s relationship with the military and General 
Odierno.  Odierno met with Secretary of State Clinton to discuss the “level of 
dysfunction at the embassy”, and Odierno outlined how Hill never engaged the Iraqis or 
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others within the diplomatic community.  Gen. Odierno said, “His only focus appeared 
to be monitoring the activities of the US military”.
310
  This presented a level of mistrust 
towards the military from State, which was different from the relationship between 
State and the military with Crocker as the ambassador before.  This appointment as 
ambassador brings to mind an interesting question of how much of the current situation 
in Iraq is the fault of Ambassador Hill, between the lack of knowledge and experience 
in the Middle East and his poor relationships with the military and the Iraqis.  Thomas 
Ricks believes that the relationship between Hill and Odierno paralleled the relationship 
between the lead civilian and the military when Bremer and Sanchez were in charge 
during 2003-2004 and therefore many problems that Iraq faces today can be attributed 
to poor management and relations during Hill’s ambassadorship.
311
  
The second factor to consider is the replacement of SECDEF Robert Gates with 
Leon Panetta at the Pentagon.  Panetta disagreed with how Obama operated with the 
secretaries and was less influential to the President than former SECDEF Gates was.  
Panetta outlined in his book Worthy Fights the relationships that President Obama had 
with his secretaries and the negative relationship that that had on policymaking, 
specifically in Iraq.  Panetta discussed how he believed the President “often limited 
decision-making to his inner circle and forgoing the advice of senior officials”, which 
he believed diminished the role and effectiveness of his Secretaries.
312
  Panetta was also 
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upset that “Obama restricted who was able to represent the government in public 
speeches and settings to his political advisers…Panetta felt failing to use specialists hurt 
the administration’s ability to explain the problems it faced to the public, or properly 
represent its policies”.
313
  This gave a political face to a non-political event that many, 
including Panetta, believed hurt the effectiveness of the policy the administration 
attempted to enact.    
Looking at the end of the Iraq War, the Obama Administration hoped that with 
the withdrawal in 2011, they could rid the US of the Iraqi question and force the Iraqis 
to figure out their sectarian and political differences for themselves.  The early signs of 
a new Iraq were built on a weak foundation and needed more time before a withdrawal 
of US forces.  The withdrawal led to a power vacuum similar to the removal of Saddam, 
and this void was filled by increased foreign involvement in the country and 
reemergence of Islamist groups.  Increasing Turkish involvement in the North, coupled 
with a stronger participation and relationship between Iran and Iraq in the dominantly 
Shi’a south, and Maliki’s abandonment of democratic principles as Prime Minister,
314
 
undermined any sense of Iraqi unity and new Iraqi identity that the Americans had 
helped to create. 
Result of the Withdrawal: Rise of ISIS     
In 2007, during the height of the Iraq operation known as “The Surge”, President Bush 
in the White House briefing room stated, “If we withdrew early before our commanders 










tell us we are ready; it would mean surrendering the future of Iraq to al Qaeda”.
315
  This 
was amidst the calls from the American populace, the international community, and 
many within the US government to withdraw from Iraq in 2007.  These calls came from 
those who had become tired of an unstable Iraq that had cost American lives and 
treasure.   
President Bush had been adamant that American forces should stay in Iraq for 
the foreseeable future and allow “The Surge” to take shape.  President Bush went on to 
say that a premature withdrawal “would increase the probability that American troops 
would have to return at some later date to confront an enemy that is even more 
dangerous”.
316
  Because of the withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, Maliki’s persecution and 
purge of Sunni leaders that resulted in the breakdown of the gains made in sectarian 
reconciliations since 2007, and the Syrian Civil War, stability decreased rapidly.  These 
factors gave way for the rise and the growth of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS).    
Since December 2011, Iraq has been very unstable.  A division of al Qaeda, 
specifically al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), reemerged out of Syria as ISIS and they were able 
to take control over a large portion of Iraq and Syria very easily.  ISIS flourished when 
the United States left and Iraq became very fragile once again, which allowed ISIS to 
march across both Iraq and Syria and took land to establish the Caliphate.  As President 
Bush and our generals had predicted, a premature withdrawal resulted in an increase in 
violence and the reestablishment of al Qaeda in Iraq.  
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The Iraqi people, not just the Sunnis, were frustrated with the lack of 
professionalism, the corruption, and the mismanagement of the postwar government 
under Maliki.
317
  The Iraqi government failed to effectively power share with the 
different sectarian groups, and Maliki began to purge Sunni political rivals from the 
government starting in 2011 and only became worse after the US withdrawal.
318
  In an 
interview with PBS, General Petraeus outlined why he believed the gains made in Iraq 
were lost and ISIS was able to grow.  After the US withdrew, Maliki began to persecute 
his political opponents and pressed charges against his Sunni VP.  Petraeus stated in 
response to these sectarian persecutions, “It started the process of undoing the progress 
that we’d worked so hard to do, during “The Surge” and the years after”.
319
  The later 
subsequent actions taken from Maliki against the Minister of Finance, prominent Sunni 
Parliamentarian leaders, and a violent response against peaceful demonstrators led to 
the belief that Sunnis no longer had a seat at the political table and were disenfranchised 
once again.      
Because of this belief of mistrust and the growing tensions between the Sunni 
people and the government, ISIS took advantage of the political instability.  ISIS 
marched across Iraq and seized major cities and territory, including the second largest 
city in Iraq, Mosul.  ISIS advanced within 8 miles of Baghdad, Iraq’s capital city, until 
the Obama Administration finally began to take the threat of ISIS seriously.    
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Author Keiko Sakai argued that ISIS was able to grow not just because the 
withdrawal of US forces but the lack of something filling that void.  Sakai claimed that 
“not just the absence of the US but also the lack of an alternative regional system to fill 
the vacuum after the US withdrawal”.
320
  Sakai agreed that after the US withdrawal, 
something needed to fill that void, whether it was Iraq or another regional power like 
Iran.  Something had to ensure order and stability was kept in Iraq.  At the time of the 
withdrawal in 2011, the Iraqi military was not strong enough to ensure and maintain 
stability across Iraq, especially with the political actions taken by Maliki since the US 
withdrawal; therefore, groups like ISIS had the ability to flourish.     
Sakai went on to say that, “ISIS emerged in the absence of a regional system or 
order in two senses: Absence of a shared feeling of solidarity based on norms, identity, 
and a value-system, and absence of a regional alliance led by the US to protect its 
interests and those of its allies”.
321
  The national system of norms, identity, or values 
that the US had worked so hard to create over the eight years in Iraq fell apart because 
of Maliki and the actions of the government after the US withdrew.  The people of Iraq 
no longer believed in the future and what Iraq could look like, but instead all of the 
advancement gained during “The Surge” evaporated.  This made it difficult to rally 
behind a single idea of what Iraq was and should be, which would have stopped the 
growth of ISIS when they were relatively weak.     
The success of ISIS and the downfall of the Iraqi government does not mean that 
Iraq cannot experience a resurgence in Iraqi nationalism and discover their new identity 
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going forward.  However, for this to happen there needs to be a new agreement from the 
Iraqi elites on how to govern, there needs to be a decentralization of government, the 
Sunni grievances need to be addressed, and the Iraqi security forces need to be reformed 
and include more Sunnis.
322
  The United States had to re-enter Iraq to assist the Iraqis in 
pushing out ISIS from the large territory the organization was able to conquer.  
However, now that ISIS has been almost eradicated from Iraq, this gives the new Iraqi 
government the ability to start over and reunite the country again.        
Concluding Remarks 
When looking at the Iraq War the most influential term associated with the conflict is 
foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC).  This creates the question how successful are 
FIRCs and what is the broader implication this operation had on Iraq and the Middle 
East.  This question is crucial in understanding US foreign policy of the past and the 
future because of the influence that FIRCs have had on US policymakers.  Policymakers 
tend to be more optimistic when believing whether a government can impose a 
democracy and regime change by force, which contradicts most studies regarding 
forced democracy operations.  Alexander Downes and Jonathan Monten look at what 
conditions are necessary in order for a FIRC to be successful or unsuccessful. 
 For example, Downes and Monten discovered that the places where an FIRC 
operation is most likely to be used, the less likely it is to be successful.  They stated, 
“Simply overthrowing foreign leaders is unlikely to enhance democracy, and may 
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actually contribute to chaos and even civil war in target states”.
323
  Especially in states 
in the Middle East and the region surrounding it, where there have been discussions 
over the last several years of potential intervention and regime change, it is important to 
note the state of the country.  Downes and Monten warn that states with little experience 




They argued that a FIRC is much more likely to be successful when the nation 
already established democratic traditions, and an FIRC is implemented to fix or restore 
a democracy from an autocracy, essentially used as safeguarding democracy instead of 
promoting democracy.
325
  This study conducted by Downes and Monten is crucial 
because of the current outlook in not only the Middle East but in other parts of the 
world.  After seven years of a civil war in Syria and with Iran, an Arab Spring, and 
North Korea under the microscope of the Trump Administration, evaluating the 
conditions and historical outlook of both of these countries is crucial in knowing how an 
FIRC would unfold if the US sought regime change in these countries.        
While Downes and Monten offered compelling points regarding FIRCs, many 
regard Iraq as a failed FIRC.  However, one crucial factor these authors discuss besides 
the pessimist and optimist views, are the views of the conditionalists.  Conditionalists 
take into account other factors that could determine the outcome of the FIRC.  For 
example, one outcome that could have been a determining factor for Iraq was the effects 
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of human error and failures on the end of the intervening power.  Iraq is a clear example 
of conditions and decisions by the intervening power that affected the outcome of the 
conflict.  This thesis outlined how after the removal of Saddam, each decision and 
policy made, further exacerbated the sectarian divide in Iraq and pushed Iraq further 
towards chaos and civil war.  These policies included the deBaathification of Iraq, the 
disbanding of the military, poor choices of leadership, inability to restart the Iraqi 
economy, and an ineffective military strategy in the early postwar years.  All of these 
policies alienated the Sunni population in Iraq, spurred violence, and ultimately gave 
rise to an insurgency and pushed Iraq towards a sectarian civil war.   
In conclusion, a majority of the problems that arose in Iraq were avoidable; this 
was due to inaction, poor policy, and bad leadership.  While the United States had to 
deal with internal struggles and decades of sectarian revenge caused by Saddam's 
leadership, there was evidence, from 2007-2011, that the Sunnis and Shi’a could form a 
functional government and the two populations could learn to coexist peacefully 
overtime.  Although the success gained was built on a fragile base and needed time to 
flourish and grow, there were early signs of stabilization and reconciliation.  This thesis 
hopes to point out certain characteristics and lessons learned from the Iraq War so that 
key policymakers can be prevented from repeating the same mistakes of the past in 
America’s next counterinsurgency operation.  The war was winnable, as “The Surge” 
showed, but to achieve victory in Iraq, the United States needed to stay the course and 
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